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INTRODUCTION

In the last two decades, a significant number of courts and legislatures
have addressed the issue of the application of comparative negligence principles to strict products liability actions.' The vast majority have decided to
meld comparative principles with strict products liability.2 However, in
1983, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Correia v. Firestone Tire &
Manufacturing Co. 3 rejected this majority view and refused to merge the two
concepts. The Correia court held that comparative principles were inappropriate in strict products liability actions because their application would
1. See Colley & Thomas, Comparative Negligence Principlesand Strict Liability."Theoretical Confluence or Confusion?, 19 TRIAL 58, 58 (Nov. 1983) (clash between strict liability and comparative negligence has major ramifications of both theoretical and
practical significance in almost half the states).
2. For a summary of the number of states which have decided to apply comparative principles to strict liability, see text accompanying notes 69-105 & 118-26 in/ra.
3. 388 Mass. 342, 446 N.E.2d 1033 (1983).

(695)
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4
frustrate the policies underlying strict products liability.
As a preliminary matter, this comment will trace briefly the development of comparative negligence 5 and strict products liability. 6 The comment will then analyze the rationale for extending comparative principles to
strict products liability and will focus on how the states which have consid7
ered the issue have resolved it.

The comment will next analyze the Correiadecision in light of the development of products liability law in Massachusetts. It will evaluate and attempt to counter the arguments that the Corre'a court presented against the
application of comparative principles to strict products liability. 8
Finally, the comment will provide a short history of the development of
strict products liability law in Pennsylvania and will argue that Pennsylvania courts, given the opportunity, should decide to apply comparative
principles to strict products liability. 9

II.

THE EMERGENCE OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE

Comparative negligence evolved as a means of apportioning liability
between a negligent defendant and a contributorily negligent plaintiff.' 0
Under negligence theory, a person is required to act in a reasonable and
prudent manner.'1 When the person fails to act reasonably, he becomes
12
liable to others for injuries caused by his conduct.
4. For a discussion of the Correia case and products liability law in Massachusetts, see notes 178-202 and accompanying text nfra.
5. For a discussion of the development of comparative negligence, see notes 1027 and accompanying text in/fa.
6. For a discussion of the development of strict products liability, see notes 28-45
and accompanying text infra.
7. For a discussion and analysis of how states have applied comparative principles to strict liability and warranty actions, see notes 46-105 & 118-37 and accompanying text infra.
8. For an analysis of the Correia decision, see notes 203-30 and accompanying
text infra.

9. For a discussion of the history of products liability in Pennsylvania and a
prognostication of why Pennsylvania should apply comparative principles to strict
liability, see notes 231-67 and accompanying text infa.
10. Carestia, The Interaction of Comparative Negligence and Strict Products LiabiltWhere are We?, 47 INS. COUNS. J. 53, 57 (1980). Negligence became recognized as an
independent tort about 1825. Id. Prior to that time, it was used in a general sense to
describe any inadvertent breach of a legal obligation. Id. For a discussion of the
early development of negligence, see Winfield, The History of Negligence tn the Law of
Torts, 42 LAw Q. REv. 184 (1926).
11. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1971). The conduct of the actor

is compared to a reasonably prudent person standard. Seavey, Negligence-Subjective
or Objective, 41 HARV. L. REv. 1, 9 (1927). For a discussion of the qualities and characteristics of the reasonably prudent person, see id.; W. PROSSER, supra.
12. SeeWinfield, supranote 10, at 184. Under the negligence doctrine, liability is
imposed when a person is injured by another's "breach of a legal duty to take care by
an inadvertent act or omission. . . ." Id. A negligence cause of action consists of four
elements. W. PROSSER, supra note 11, § 30. First, there is a duty of care to protect
others against unreasonable risks. Id. Second, there is a failure to conform to that
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The defense of contributory negligence originated in the English case of
Butterfeldv. Forrester,13 in which the court held that a plaintiff would be absolutely barred from recovery if his own negligence contributed to the injury.14
The doctrine of contributory negligence was quickly adopted by American
courts. 15

Contributory negligence came under attack, however, because of the
harsh results which occurred when plaintiffs were denied recovery in cases
where they were only slightly negligent.' 6 Consequently, the courts devised
a number of exceptions to the doctrine,' 7 including the doctrine of the "last
clear chance."1 8 However, even the exceptions were criticized because they,
duty of care. Id. Third, there is a causal connection between that breach of duty and
the resulting injury. Id. Fourth, an injury occurs. Id.
13. 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809). The plaintiff was injured when he
rode his horse into a pole which had been placed across part of a road. Id, 103 Eng.
Rep. at 926-27. An observer stated that if the plaintiff had not been riding his horse
at a violent pace he could have avoided the accident. Id., 103 Eng. Rep. at 927.
14. Id. at 61, 103 Eng. Rep. at 927. Chief Justice Lord Ellenborough stated:
A party is not to cast himself upon an obstruction which has been made by
the fault of another, and avail himself of it, if he do not himself use common
and ordinary caution to be in the right. . . . One person being in fault will
not dispense with another's using ordinary care for himself. Two things
must concur to support this action, an obstruction in the road by the fault
of the defendant, and no want of ordinary care to avoid it on the part of the
plaintiff.
Id.
15. See Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 (1953). Contributory negligence developed rapidly during the early industrial revolution. Id. at 4.
Contributory negligence, along with the concepts of duty and proximate cause, were
used by courts to control juries so that new industries would be protected against
substantial liabilities. Id
16. Id. at 4. The rule was criticized because of its obvious injustice "which visits
the entire loss caused by the fault of two parties on one of them alone, and that one
the injured plaintiff, least able to bear it, and quite possibly much less at fault than
the defendant who goes scot free." Id
See W. PROSSER, supra note 11, § 67, at 433. Dean Prosser commented that
under contributory negligence, even if plaintiff's negligence was slight, while the defendant's extreme, the plaintiff would be barred from recovery. Id See also Turk,
Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 CHI.-KENr L. REV. 189, 199-200 (1950) (contributory negligence is a complete bar to recovery regardless of how slight a cause of
the injury).
17. Prosser, supra note 15, at 5. The first exception to the contributory negligence defense was where the defendant's conduct was "willful," "wanton," or "reckless." Id A second exception to the applicability of the defense was where the action
was founded upon a defendant's violation of a statute. Id.
18. The "last clear chance" doctrine was developed in Davies v. Mann, 10 M. &
W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842). In Davies, the defendant negligently ran into the
plaintiff's donkey. The plaintiff had left the donkey shackled in the highway so that
it could not get out of the defendant's way. Id. The court held the defendant liable
on the grounds that, although the donkey may have been illegally on the street, the
defendant could have avoided the accident through the exercise of proper care. Id. at
548-49, 152 Eng. Rep. 589. The doctrine is based on the principle that the defendant
should bear the loss where he has the better opportunity to avoid the harm, even
though the plaintiff is also careless. Turk, supra note 16, at 205.
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too, shifted the entire loss onto one party, when in actuality two parties were

responsible. 19
Comparative negligence entered American law in the early twentieth
century. In 1910, it was incorporated into the Federal Employers Liability
Act, which covers injuries to railroad employees, 20 and, in 1920, it was incorporated into the Jones Act, which covers injuries to seamen. 2 ' Beginning
with Mississippi, Georgia and Wisconsin, comparative negligence was gradually adopted by a majority of the states and applied to all causes of action
grounded in negligence. 22 Most recently, comparative negligence has been
applied in apportioning liability in instances where the plaintiff's conduct
goes beyond contributory negligence and constitutes assumption of the
23
risk.
Presently, forty states utilize some form of comparative negligence.
19. Prosser, supra note 15, at 8. Dean Prosser notes that it is no more reasonable
to charge the defendant with the plaintiff's share of the fault than to do the reverse.
Id. Another commentator notes that if the doctrine of contributory negligence is
arbitrary because it totally precludes recovery by the plaintiff, then so is the last clear
chance exception because it permits full recovery by the plaintiff. Turk, supra, note
16, at 205.
20. 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1976). The statute provides:
In all actions on and after April 22, 1908 brought against any such common
carrier by railroad under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this chapter
to recover damages for personal injuries to an employee, or where such injuries have resulted in his death, the fact that the employee may have been
guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages
shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to such employee ...
Id

21. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976). The statute incorporates the provisions of the Federal Employers Liability Act, by providing:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the
right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States
modifying or extending the common-law right of remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply ...
Id

22. For a history of the adoption of comparative negligence by the states, see
Woods, The Quickening March of Comparative Fault, 15 TRIAL 26 (Nov. 1979). For a

more general history of the development of comparative negligence, see C. HEFT &
C.J. HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL ch. 2 (1978); V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (1974).

23. See, e.g., Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., 187 Mont. 471, 610 P.2d 668
(1980); Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981); Jacobsen Constr. Co. v.
Structo-Lite Eng'g, Inc., 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980). For a discussion of the different
methods by which assumption of the risk is applied in a comparative negligence analysis, see Shaw, The Role of Assumption of Risk in Systems of Comparative Negligence, 46 INS.
COUNS. J. 360 (1979).

Assumption of the risk consists of the "voluntary and willing encounter of a risk
of danger which is known, appreciated and understood by the plaintiff." Clarke v.
Brockway Motor Trucks, 372 F. Supp. 1342, 1347 (E.D. Pa. 1974). While contributory negligence is based on a reasonable man standard, assumption of the risk is
measured by the subjective standard of the plaintiff himself. W. PROSSER, supra note
11, § 68 at 456. When assumption of the risk consists of a knowingly unreasonable
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Twelve states have adopted a pure form of comparative negligence. Under
pure comparative negligence, a plaintiff's negligence, regardless of the degree, will not bar recovery but will only reduce the plaintiffs award accordingly.2 4 Other states utilize modified forms of comparative negligence.
Thirteen states apply a "less than" modified comparative negligence approach. Under this approach, the plaintiff will not be barred from recovery
so long as the plaintiffs negligence is less than that of the defendant. However, the plaintiffs award will be reduced by an amount equal to his degree
of fault. 25 Thirteen other states apply a "not greater than" modified comparative approach. Under this approach, the plaintiff will not be barred
from recovery so long as the plaintiffs negligence is less or equal to that of
the defendant, but again will have his award reduced. 26 Under a third modified comparative negligence approach, applied by two states, the plaintiff
recovers reduced damages so long as the plaintiffs negligence is slight in
27
comparison to that of the defendant.
use of a product, it is a total defense in strict products liability. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965).
24. See, e.g., Alaska, Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); California, Li
v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Florida,
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Illinois, Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421
N.E.2d 886 (1981); Iowa, Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W. 2d 742 (Iowa 1982); Louisiana, LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (West Supp. 1984); Michigan, Placek v. City of
Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979); Mississippi, Miss. CODE
ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); New Mexico, Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234
(1981); New York, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 1976); Rhode Island,
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1983); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.22.05 (Supp. 1983-84).
25. See, e.g., Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1765 (1979); Colorado, CoLo.
REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (Supp. 1983); Georgia, Zayre of Georgia, Inc. v. Ray, 117
Ga. App. 396, 160 S.E.2d 648 (1968); Hawaii, HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1976);
Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 6-801 (1979); Kansas, KAN. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-258a
(Vernon Supp. 1984); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1980); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West Supp. 1984-85); Minnesota, MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1984); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07
(1975); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (1977); West Virginia, Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979); Wyoming, Wvo. STAT. § 1-1-109
(1977).
26. See, e.g., Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West Supp.
1984); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-4 (West Supp. 1983-84); Montana,
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (1983); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1979);
New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-A (1983); New Jersey, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West Supp. 1984-85); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19
(Page 1981); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 13 (West Supp. 1983-84); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1981); Pennsylvania, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 7102(a) (Purdon 1982); Texas, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon

Supp. 1982-83); Vermont,

VT. STAT. ANN. tit.

12, § 1036 (Supp. 1983-84); Wiscon-

sin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1983).
27. See, e.g., Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1979); South Dakota, S.D.
CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 20-9-2 (1979).
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY

The concept of strict products liability may be traced to the concurring
opinion of Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court in Escola v.Coca
Cola Bottling Co. 2 3 His views in this 1941 decision ultimately formed the basis
for the now-famed California Supreme Court decision in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc.2 9 In Greenman, the court defined the parameters of strict
products liability, holding that a manufacturer would be strictly liable in
tort for injuries caused by a defect in a product which it marketed, when it
30
knew that the product would not be inspected prior to use.
The belief that a manufacturer of a product should be held liable for
injuries proximately caused by its product derives in part from judicial dissatisfaction with negligence 31 and warranty theories. 32 In negligence ac28. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944). In Escola, the plaintiff, a waitress in a
restaurant, was injured when a bottle of Coca Cola exploded in her hand. Id.at 456,
150 P.2d at 437. The court held that the plaintiff could invoke the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitor to infer negligence on the part of the defendant. Id.at 461, 150 P.2d at
440.
Justice Traynor, in a concurring opinion, stated that "it should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an article that he has
placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves to have
a defect that causes injury to human beings." Id. (Traynor, J., concurring). He believed that public policy required the manufacturer to bear the responsibility for
product defects since the manufacturer could anticipate and guard against some dangers. Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 440-41 (Traynor, J., concurring). In addition, he noted
that the injured party may be unable to bear the costs of the injury, and that the
manufacturer was in a better position to absorb these costs since he could distribute
them over the consuming public as a cost of doing business. Id. Justice Traynor
believed it was time to openly hold a manufacturer responsible for the quality of his
product, regardless of negligence. Id. at 463, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring). For further discussion ofJustice Traynor's views on strict products liability, see
Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liabiity, 32 TENN. L.
REV. 363 (1965).
29. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). In Greenman, the
plaintiff sued the retailer and manufacturer of a shopsmith, which was a combination
power tool. Id at 59, 377 P.2d at 898, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698. The plaintiff sought
recovery for injuries he incurred when a piece of wood flew out of the shopsmith
when he was using it as a lathe, and struck him on the forehead. Id.
30. Id.at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700. The court emphasized that

strict liability in tort for marketing a defective product was liability imposed by law.
Id at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. The law of contract warranties was
not applicable, and the plaintiff's remedies were not dependent on the law of sales.
Id.at 63-64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. Consequently, to recover, the
plaintiff only had to prove that his injury was caused by a defect in the product. Id.
at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
31. A products liability action framed in negligence lies when the manufacturer's product causes injury while used in a reasonably foreseeable way where the
manufacturer's failure to exercise reasonable care created a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm. Note, Torts--Strict Liabihty-Under Pennsylvania Law Damages
Solely to a Defective ProductItself are Recoverable Under Section 402A, 27 VILL. L. REV. 836,
841 n.17 (1982). A manufacturer may be negligent in the manufacture, design, inspection or marketing of the product. See Noel, Manufacturers' Liabiliyfor Neghgence,
33 TENN. L. REV. 444, 453-62 (1966); W. PROSSER, supra note 11, § 96, at 644.

32. The basis of the breach of warranty action is that the plaintiff was injured
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tions, it was believed that the plaintiffs burden of proving that the
because the defendant's product failed to comply with the governing warranties.
Note, Massachusetts Strict ProductsLiability Law. Alternate Route, Same Destinaton, 14 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 237, 241-42 (1978). The applicable warranties are governed by the
Uniform Commercial Code. See U.C.C. §§ 2-313, -314, -315 (1976). Breach of an
express warranty is provided for in § 2-313 which states:
Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise, Description, Sample
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation
or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of
the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the
description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform
to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller
use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of
the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or
commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.
U.C.C. § 2-213 (1976).
Breach of the implied warranty of merchantability is provided for in § 2-314
which states:
Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of Trade
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section
the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises
or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description;
and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the
description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even
kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved;
and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement
may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warranties
may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
U.C.C. § 2-314 (1976).
Breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is provided for
in § 2-315 which states:
Implied Warranty: Fitness for Particular Purpose
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is
relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods,
there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
U.C.C. § 2-314 (1976).
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defendant manufacturer acted unreasonably was too heavy.3 3 Further, in
warranty actions, the plaintiff's recovery was often barred by obstacles such
34
as notice requirements and sellers' disclaimers.
The doctrine of strict liability stemmed not only from judicial frustration with prevailing theories of recovery, but also from several important
policy considerations such as risk spreading and deterrence.3 5 Another leading consideration was the "deep pockets" rationale that a manufacturer, because of its resources, was more capable of bearing the costs of an accident
than the injured consumer. 3 6 These policy considerations played a key role
3
in the drafting of section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts in 1964. 1
33. See Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in Products Liability Law-A Review of Basic

Principles, 45 Mo. L. REV. 579, 583-85 (1980). There were two major obstacles to
recovery under a negligence theory. Id.at 584. First, it was difficult to prove the
negligence of a manufacturer. Id.Second, the manufacturer could satisfy his duty of
care regarding latent dangers by simply warning about them. Id. at 584-85. See also
Greenlee & Rochelle, ComparativeNegligence andStrict Tort Liabilty-A Marriageof Necessity, 18 LAND & WATER L. REV. 643, 646 (1983) (plaintiff had burden of proving

that "huge, well-financed, well-defended" defendant manufacturer had been
negligent).
34. See Keeton, supra note 33, at 583-85. Under a warranty theory, there were
two obstacles to recovery. First the seller could disclaim or limit the warranty. Id at
583. Second, those not privy to the contract could not recover for breach of warranty. Id at 584. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 11, § 97 at 655 (injured consumer
required to give seller notice within reasonable time of the breach in order to recover
in warranty).
35. See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liabihy for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825

(1973). This commentator set forth the following public policy reasons in support of
strict products liability: 1) the plaintiff was relieved of the difficulty of proving the
manufacturer's negligence, 2) the cost of the injury was spread out over the consuming public instead of falling on one person, and 3) the potential imposition of strict
liability would deter manufacturers from creating unsafe products. Id.at 826. For a
critique of these and other policy reasons underlying strict products liability, see
Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681, 703-14

(1980).
36. See Wright, Hoelter-Skelter: Product Defect andPlantiffNeghence-A Connecticut

Commentary on Confusion, 10 CONN. L. REV. 90, 117 (1977) (general view is that businessmen are better able to absorb accident costs since they can estimate risks, plan for
them, and consider them as a cost of doing business). But cf Plant, ComparativeNegligence and Strict Tort Liabtity, 40 LA. L. REV. 403, 416 (1980) (although large corporation may be capable of handling products liability suits, small company is unable to
bear such a cost).
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965). In a
comment, the Restatement's drafters noted the policy reasons supporting the imposition of strict liability for defective products:
On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability has been said to
be that the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has
undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the
consuming public who may be injured by it; that the public has the right to
and does expect, in the case of products which it needs and for which it is
forced to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their
goods; that public policy demands that the burden of accidental tjuries caused by
products intendedforconsumption be placed upon those who market them, andbe treated
as a cost ofproduction againstwhich hability insurance can be obtaineA and that the

consumer of such products is entitled to the maximum of protection at the
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Section 402A provides that a seller is liable for selling a defective product which is unreasonably dangerous. 38 Liability under section 402A is
based on strict liability in tort.3 9 A seller is liable for injuries caused by the
product unless it is misused

40

or the consumer assumes the risk of injury.

41

Presently, a majority of states have adopted section 402A either by judicial decision 4 2 or by legislative enactment. 43 Many other states have implehands of someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those who market
the products.
Id. (emphasis added).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A. Section 402A provides in full:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.

Id
39. Id comment m. Section 402A liability is not governed by the law of sales or
U.C.C. warranties, nor is it based on negligence. Id Consequently, a seller is liable
even though he has exercised reasonable care in the manufacture and sale of the
product. Id comment a.
40. Id comment h. This comment provides the basis for the misuse defense; it
states:
A product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal handling
and consumption. If the injury results from abnormal handling, as where a
bottled beverage is knocked against a radiator to remove the cap, or from
abnormal preparation for use, as where too much salt is added to food, or
from abnormal consumption, as where a child eats too much candy and is
made ill, the seller is not liable.
Id.
41. Id. comment n. Contributory negligence consisting of a failure to inspect a
product or guard against the possibility of a defect is not a defense. Id However,
where the user or consumer "discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and
nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it,
he is barred from recovery." Id
42. See, e.g., Alabama, Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134 (Ala.
1976); Arizona, O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968); Colorado, Bradford v. Bendix-Westinghouse Auto. Air Brake Co., 33 Colo. App. 99, 517
P.2d 406 (1974); Connecticut, Wachtel v. Rosol, 159 Conn. 496, 271 A.2d 84 (1970);
Florida, West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1972); Hawaii, Stewart
v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 52 Hawaii 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970); Idaho, Shields v.
Morton Chem. Co., 95 Idaho 674, 518 P.2d 857 (1974); Indiana, Perfection Paint &
Color Co. v. Konduris, 147 Ind. App. 106, 258 N.E.2d 681 (1970); Iowa, Hawkeye
Sec. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1970); Kansas, Brooks v.
Dietz, 218 Kan. 698, 545 P.2d 1104 (1976); Kentucky, Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery
Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1965); Maryland, Phipps v. General Motors Corp.,
278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976); Mississippi, State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189
So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966); Missouri, Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362
(Mo. 1969); Montana, Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, 162 Mont. 506, 513
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mented strict tort liability theories for products liability which are virtually
equivalent to section 402A. 4 4 Only five states have refused to adopt the theP.2d 268 (1973); New Hampshire, Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, Inc., 110 N.H.
36, 260 A.2d 111 (1969); New Mexico, Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d
732 (1972); New York, Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49
N.Y.2d 471, 403 N.E.2d 440, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1980); North Dakota, Johnson v.
American Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974); Oklahoma, Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974); Oregon, Heaton v. Ford Motor Co.,
248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967); Pennsylvania, Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d
853 (1966); Rhode Island, Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 109 R.I. 176, 283 A.2d
255 (1971); South Dakota, Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 87 S.D. 196, 205 N.W.2d 104
(1973); Texas, Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969); Utah, Ernest
W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979); Vermont, Zaleskie v.
Joyce, 133 Vt. 150, 333 A.2d 110 (1975); Washington, Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75
Wash. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969); Wisconsin, Dipple v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155
N.W.2d 55 (1967).
43. Maine has adopted § 402A by statute. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 221 (1980). It provides:
One who sells any goods or products in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to a person whom the manufacturer,
seller or supplier might reasonably have expected to use, consume or be
affected by the goods, or to his property, if the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product and it is expected to and does reach the user
or consumer without significant change in the condition in which it is sold.
This section applies although the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product and the user or consumer has not
bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the
seller.
Id.
Arkansas' statute also incorporates the language of section 402A. See ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 85-2-318.2 (1983 Supp.). It provides:
A supplier of a product is subject to liability in damages for harm to a
person or to property if:
(a) the supplier is engaged in the business of manufacturing, assembling, selling, leasing or otherwise distributing such product;
(b) the product was supplied by him in a defective condition which
rendered it unreasonably dangerous; and
(c) the defective condition was a proximate cause of the harm to person
or to property.
Id.
44. See, e.g., Alaska, Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970); California,
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1962); Delaware, Martin v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 353 A.2d 581 (Del. 1976);
Illinois, Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Louisiana,
Weber v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971); Michigan, Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965); Minnesota, Kerr v. Corning Glass Works, 284 Minn. 115, 169 N.W.2d 587 (1969);
Nebraska, Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601 (1971); Nevada,
Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 86 Nev. 408, 470 P.2d 135 (1970); New Jersey, Santor
v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Ohio, Lonzrick v.
Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966); Tennessee, Ford
Motor Co., v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966); West Virginia,
Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va. 1979).
In addition, Georgia provides for strict liability for manufacturers in the sale of
personal property. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11 (b)(1) (1982). It provides:
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ory of strict products liability, with those states relying instead on warranty
45
theories as adequate remedies.

IV.

THE APPLICATION OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE PRINCIPLES TO
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS

A.

Court Decisions Favoring the Application

The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Dippel v. Sciano,46 was the first court
to consider the application of comparative negligence principles to strict
products liability. Initially, the court adopted strict liability under section
402A. 4 7 The court then considered the application of the state's comparative negligence statute 48 to strict liability. In addressing this question, the
court analogized the doctrine of strict liability to negligence per se. 49 The
The manufacturer of any personal property sold as new property directly or through a dealer or any other person shall be liable in tort, irrespective of privity, to any natural person who may use, consume, or
reasonably be affected by the property and who suffers injury to his person
or property because the property when sold by the manufacturer was not
merchantable and reasonably suited to the use intended, and its condition
when sold is the proximate cause of the injury sustained.
Id.
45. See, e.g., Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-314 to -318
(West 1958); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-314 to -318 (1965); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-314 to -318 (Law. Co-op. 1977); Virginia, VA. CODE
§ 8.2-314 to -318 (1965); Wyoming, Wvo. STAT. § 34-21-231 to -235 (1977).
46. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). In DTipe/, the plaintiff was severely
injured when the front leg assembly of a large coin-operated pool table collapsed,
crushing his foot. Id. at 447, 155 N.W.2d at 56. At the time of the injury, the plaintiff and another man were moving the 750-pound table to a location in the tavern
where it could be used. Id. The plaintiff sued the table manufacturer, the sales
distributor, the purchaser and lessor of the table, and the tavern which leased the
table and offered it for its patrons' use. Id. at 447-48, 155 N.W.2d at 56. The plaintiff's causes of action were grounded in negligence and warranty. Id. at 448, 155
N.W.2d at 57.
47. Id. at 459, 155 N.W.2d at 63. Because the court had adopted strict liability,
it permitted the plaintiff to amend his complaint to include an action in strict liability. Id. at 463, 155 N.W.2d at 65.
48. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1983). The statute provides:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any
person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property, if such negligence was not
greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought,
but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the
amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering.
Id
49. 37 Wis. 2d at 460-62, 155 N.W.2d at 63-65. In making some general observations concerning the impact of the adoption of the strict liability rule, the court
stated that contributory negligence was an available defense in strict liability. Id. at
460, 155 N.W.2d at 63. The court also determined that strict liability was similar to
negligence per se because neither doctrine was based on foreseeability. Id. at 461, 155
N.W.2d at 65. The court noted that both the act of placing a defective product on
the market and the violation of a safety statute created conditions of unreasonable
risk of harm to others. Id. at 462, 155 N.W.2d at 64-65.
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court then noted that the Wisconsin comparative negligence statute had
been applied to actions grounded in negligence per se.50 Based on this finding the court held that comparative negligence was likewise applicable to
actions in strict liability. 5 1
After Dippel, the movement to apply comparative negligence principles
to strict liability did not gain momentum until the California Supreme
Court addressed the issue in 1978. In Daly v. Genera/Motors Corp.,52 the California Supreme Court held that its judicially-created rule of comparative
negligence 53 was applicable to a strict products liability action. 54 The Daly
court took a result-oriented approach, finding that semantic consistency between the concepts of strict liability and negligence was not as important as
the attainment of an equitable result. 55 The Daly court noted that courts
originally imposed strict liability to relieve the plaintiff of the difficult burden of proof found in negligence actions 56 and to place the burden of loss on
a manufacturer rather than an innocent consumer. 57 With the application
50. Id. at 462, 155 N.W.2d at 64-65. The court noted that the comparative negligence statute had been applied to actions based on negligence per se for violation of
safety statutes. Id.
51. Id. The seller was permitted to use the comparative negligence defense
when the plaintiff had been contributorily negligent or had assumed the risk of injury. Id. at 460, 155 N.W.2d at 63-64.
52. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978). The case involved
an automobile accident in which the decedent was killed when he was ejected from
the automobile. Id at 730, 575 P.2d at 1164, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 382. The plaintiffs,
the decedent's wife and surviving children, alleged that a defective door latch caused
the decedent to be ejected from the automobile. Id. The defendant manufacturer
alleged that the decedent's negligence in not using the door lock or seat belt-shoulder
harness contributed to his being ejected from the automobile. Id. at 731, 575 P.2d at
1165, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 383. For a discussion of the Daly decision, see Comment,
Another Citadel Has Fallen-This Time the Plaintiff . California Apphes ComparativeNegligence to Strtct Products Liability, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 485 (1979).
53. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1975). In Lit the court adopted a pure form of comparative negligence for application in California. Id. at 827, 532 P.2d at 1242, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
54. 20 Cal. 3d at 742, 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
55. Id at 736, 575 P.2d at 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386. The court suggested that
the terms comparative negligence, contributory negligence and assumption of the
risk should not be defined so rigidly as to override countervailing policy considerations. Id. The court noted that "[tlhe interweaving of concept and terminology in
this area suggests a judicial posture that is flexible rather than doctrinaire." Id.
56. Id. (citing Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153,
1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal.
2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-62, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring)). For a discussion of Escola, see note 28 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Greenman,
see notes 29-30 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of problems of proof in
negligence products liability actions, see note 33 supra.
57. 20 Cal. 3d at 736, 575 P.2d at 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386 (citing Greenman
v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 59, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697,
701 (1963); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 251, 466 P.2d
722, 726, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178, 182 (1970)). For a discussion of Escola, see note 28 and
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of comparative principles, the court found that the plaintiff would continue
to be relieved of difficult proof requirements since the manufacturer's liability remained strict. 58 In addition, the court observed that the manufacturer,
and not the defenseless plaintiff, would still bear the cost of injury caused by
the product. 59 Thus, the court found that the net effect of the application of
comparative principles to strict liability actions would only be to reduce a
plaintiff's recovery by that amount which is proportionate to his own fault in
causing the injury. 60 The court further reasoned that the introduction of
comparative principles into a strict products liability suit would not cause a
manufacturer to create less safe products, 61 nor would it render a jury incapable of comparing the plaintiff's negligence with the defendant's strict liability.62 Finally, the Daly court observed that, in cases where comparative
principles applied, a plaintiff's assumption of the risk would only reduce his
award, whereas in cases where they did not apply, the plaintiffis assumption
63
of the risk would be a complete bar to recovery.
Following Daly, many courts began to invoke comparative negligence
principles in strict products liability actions. In Suter v. San Angelo Foundy &
Machine Co., 64 the Supreme Court of New Jersey determined that the language of its comparative negligence statute was applicable in strict liability
accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Greenman, see notes 29-30 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the policy of placing the burden of loss on the
manufacturer, see note 36 and accompanying text supra.
58. 20 Cal. 3d at 736-37, 575 P.2d at 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386. The plaintiff
would still not be required to prove negligence on the part of the manufacturer or
distributor in the production, design, or dissemination of the product. Id.
59. Id., 575 P.2d at 1168-69, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386-87.
60. Id. at 737, 575 P.2d at 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
61. Id. at 738, 575 P.2d at 1169, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387. The court noted three
reasons why a manufacturer would be inclined towards continuing to make a safe
product. First, even if a consumer were contributorily negligent, the manufacturer
would still be liable for the defective product. Id. Second, a manufacturer could not
anticipate that a consumer would be contributorily negligent. Id Third, if assumption of the risk remained a complete defense, a manufacturer would be more inclined
to create patently defective products. Id. at 738, 575 P.2d at 1169, 144 Cal. Rptr. at
387.
62. Id., 575 P.2d at 1170, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 388. The court noted that in admiralty cases, under the "unseaworthiness" doctrine, a form of strict liability, jurors had
no difficulties considering the plaintiff's own fault. Id. at 738-39, 575 P.2d at 1170,
144 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
63. Id at 738, 575 P.2d at 1169, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387. The court noted that
assumption of the risk is traditionally a complete defense in strict liability. Id. See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965) (unreasonable
assumption of risk an absolute bar). However, under a comparative approach it is
only a reducing factor. 20 Cal. 3d at 738, 575 P.2d at 1169-70, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 38788.
64. 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979). The plaintiff was injured when his hand
became caught in the cylinders of an industrial sheet metal rolling machine. Id at
154, 406 A.2d at 141. While attempting to remove a piece of slag from the cylinders,
the plaintiff brushed against the machine activating the rollers which caught his
hand. Id. at 157, 406 A.2d at 143. The plaintiff alleged a defective design since the
machine did not have a guard to prevent the levers from being accidentally acti-
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suits. The court interpreted the term "negligence" in the statute to cover
fault in a broader sense, beyond the narrow negligence concept. 65 Consequently, the court found that the statute applied to all actions grounded in
tortious fault. 66 The court then examined the doctrine of strict liability and
defined it as a fault concept, reasoning that conduct which endangers others
is considered to be fault. 67 With this reasoning, the court brought strict liability within the concept of tortious fault and held that the New Jersey comparative negligence statute was applicable to strict liability actions. 68
In addition to Wisconsin, California and New Jersey, eight other states
have judicially applied comparative negligence principles to strict products
liability. In Busch v. Busch Construction Inc.,69 the Minnesota Supreme Court,
following the reasoning of the Wisconsin court in Dippel, applied its state's
vated. Id. The defendant countered that plaintiff had placed himself in an unsafe
position by reaching into the machine without cutting off power to the machine. Id.
65. Id. at 162 n.2, 406 A.2d at 145 n.2. The court examined the language of the
statute to determine the legislative intent and found that it was the legislature's purpose, in passing the statute, to ameliorate the harshness of contributory negligence
when applied to any tort action. Id at 161, 406 A.2d at 145. The New Jersey
Supreme Court disagreed with the analysis of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). 81 N.J. 162 n.2, 406 A.2d 145
n.2. The New Jersey Supreme Court believed that a comparative negligence statute
was applicable to strict liability, not because strict liability was akin to negligence per
se, but because the statute was meant to cover fault in a broad sense, beyond mere
negligence. Id
The New Jersey comparative negligence statute provides:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any
person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property, if such negligence was not
greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought,
or was not greater than the combined negligence of the persons against
whom recovery is sought. Any damages sustained shall be diminished by
the percentage of negligence attributable to the person recovering.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West Supp. 1983-84).
66. 81 N.J. at 162, 406 A.2d at 145.
67. Id., 406 A.2d at 146. The court said that the failure of a manufacturer to
distribute a product which is fit, suitable and duly safe constitutes fault. Id. The
court then quoted Dean Prosser's definition of "fault":
There is a broader sense in which "fault" means nothing more than a departure from a standard of conduct required of a man by society for the
protection of his neighbors; and if the departure is an innocent one, and the
defendant cannot help it, it is none the less a departure, and a social wrong.
The distinction still remains between the man who has deviated from the
standard, and the man who has not. The defendant may not be to blame
for being out of line with what society requires of him, but he is none the
less out of line.
Id. (quoting W. PROSSER, supra note 11, § 75 at 93).
68. 81 N.J. at 164, 406 A.2d at 147.
69. 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977). The case involved an auto accident in which
the plaintiff was driving a car owned by the defendant company and manufactured
by defendant General Motors. Id. at 383. The car drifted off the road, down an
embankment, and plunged into a swamp. Id. at 384. The plaintiff contended that a
defect in the turn signal switch caused the steering wheel to lock. Id. General Motors
claimed that there was no defect and the cause of the accident was the plaintiff's
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comparative negligence statute to strict liability.70 Similarly, the Supreme
Court of Hawaii, impressed with the reasoning of the Daly court, applied
71
comparative negligence to strict liability in Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing.
In addition, Alaska, 7 2 Florida, 7 3 Mississippi,

74

Montana, 75 Oregon, 7 6 and

77

West Virginia extended comparative negligence principles to strict liability through judicial decision.
Courts in six states and one territory have determined that a comparative causation approach, rather than a comparative negligence or fault approach, is applicable to strict products liability.
Under comparative
causation, damages reflect the degree to which each party is a cause of the
injuries which occur, whereas, under comparative negligence, damages are
assessed in proportion to the fault of each party. 78 In Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v.
Avco-Lycoming Corp.,79 an Idaho federal district court held that the state's
comparative negligence statute required a comparison of all legal causes of
the plaintiffs injuries.8 0 The court stated that this comparative causation
theory required an apportionment of damages according to the percent that
drowsiness and inattention. Id The jury found the plaintiff 15% negligent and General Motors 85% at fault due to the defect. Id. at 383.
70. Id. at 393. The court upheld the jury's apportionment of fault. Id at 394.
The court stated that when Minnesota adopted the Wisconsin comparative negligence statute, it also adopted the Wisconsin Supreme Court's interpretations and
applications of the statute. Id at 393.
71. 65 Hawaii 447, 654 P.2d 343 (1982). The plaintiff had been injured while
erecting a building when the beam on which he was standing collapsed, causing the
plaintiff to fall 20 feet. Id at 448-49, 654 P.2d at 345. The jury found the defendant
building company strictly liable and the plaintiff negligent. Id at 449-50, 654 P.2d at
345. Persuaded by the Daly court's arguments, the Hawaii Supreme Court merged
the concepts of strict products liability and comparative negligence. Id. at 463, 654
P.2d at 354.
72. See Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42
(Alaska 1976).
73. See West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976). For a discussion of West, see notes 130-34 and accompanying text tnfra.
74. See Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975) (interpreting Mississippi law).
75. See Zahrte v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 661 P.2d 17 (Mont. 1983) (comparative
principles apply to contributory negligence and assumption of risk).
76. See Sandford v. Chevrolet Div. of Gen. Motors, 292 Or. 590, 642 P.2d 624
(1982).
77. See Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va.
1982). For a discussion of StarFumriture,see notes 10 1-04 and accompanying text infra.
78. See Sandford v. Chevrolet Div. of Gen. Motors, 292 Or. 590, 642 P.2d 624,
628-29 (1982). The court noted that causation could be scientifically apportioned,
while fault could not be scientifically measured. Id., 642 P.2d at 628 (citing V.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 276).
79. 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976). The case involved an airplane crash. Id.
at 599. The jury found the plaintiff corporation's pilot and mechanic 90% the cause
of the crash, and the defendant manufacturer of the airplane 10% of the cause. Id. at
601.
80. Id. at 603.
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each party's conduct was a cause of the injury. 8 1
Most recently, in Coney v.jL. Industries,82 the Illinois Supreme Court
applied a comparative causation approach to strict liability. 83 The Coney
court determined that a comparative negligence approach was both
pragmatically and conceptually inappropriate in strict products liability
84
since negligence was a fault-based concept while strict liability was not.
87
85
and Utah 8 8 have also
New Hampshire,8 6 Texas,
Courts in Kansas,
applied this comparative causation analysis to strict products liability ac89
tions. Likewise, in Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a comparative causation approach was applicable to strict
products liability suits in the Virgin Islands.

In addition, two state courts have chosen to inject pure comparative
principles 9° into their comparative causation analyses, rejecting the modified
comparative principles9 l embodied in the states' comparative negligence
92
statutes. In GeneralMotors Corp. v.Hopkins, the Texas Supreme Court held
81. Id. The court said that once a party was found to be culpable, blameworthy, or at fault, then the label describing the quality of that fault, such as negligent or
strictly liable, became unimportant. Id n.5. The key issue then became a comparison of "the causal conduct of each party, regardless of its label." Id.
82. 97 111. 2d 104, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1983). The decedent died of injuries incurred while operating a hydraulic aerial work platform manufactured by the defendant. Id.at 109, 454 N.E.2d at 199. The plaintiff, administrator of the decedent's
estate, sued under strict liability. Id. The defendant claimed that the decedent was
negligent in his operation of the platform. Id. The defendant also alleged that the
decedent's employer was negligent in failing to properly instruct the decedent on
proper operation of the platform. Id.
83. Id.at 118, 454 N.E.2d at 203. The court stated that equity demanded that
"the total damages for plaintiff's injuries be apportioned on the basis of relative degree to which the defective product and plaintiff's conduct proximately caused
them." Id
84. Id. The court noted that comparing the seller's strict liability to the user's
negligence was theoretically difficult. Id at 116, 454 N.E.2d at 202.
85. See Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618 P.2d 788 (1980).
86. See Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978).
For a discussion of Thibault, see notes 169-71 and accompanying text iqf/a.
87. See General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977), overruled
on other grounds, Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979). For a
discussion of Hopkins, see notes 92-94 and accompanying text infra.
88. See Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981). For a discussion of Mulherin, see notes 95-98 and accompanying text inf/a.
89. 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979). For a discussion of Murray, see notes 99-100 and
accompanying text infra.
90. For a discussion of pure comparative negligence, and states which follow this
approach, see note 24 and accompanying text supra.
91. For a discussion of the various types of modified comparative negligence,
and the states which follow each approach, see notes 25-27 and accompanying text
supra.

92. 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977), overruledon other grounds, Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979). The plaintiff was badly hurt when his pickup truck overturned while rounding a curve. Id at 346. The plaintiff claimed that
he lost control of the truck because of a defect in the carburetor which caused it to
lock in an open position. Id The manufacturer argued that any malfunction in the
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that where a plaintiff's injuries were caused by both a product defect and the
plaintiff's misuse of the product, the plaintiff's recovery should be reduced
by an amount equal to the degree to which the plaintiff's misuse was a concurring proximate cause of his injuries. 9 3 The court emphasized that this
pure comparative causation approach differed from the state's statutory
modified comparative negligence analysis because, under the statute, the
plaintiff would be barred from recovery if his negligence was greater than
94
the defendant's.
Furthermore, in Mulhertn v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 9 5 the Utah Supreme
Court determined that the state's comparative negligence statute was not
applicable to strict products liability since it was limited to actions in "negligence." 96 Therefore, the court decided that it was free to determine what
carburetor was due to the plaintiff's alterations in removing and reinstalling the carburetor. Id at 348.
93. Id.at 351. The court rejected misuse as a total defense where the product
was dangerous and that danger also contributed to the injuries. Id However, the
court also believed that a manufacturer should not reimburse a plaintiff for that
portion of his injuries caused by his own fault. Id The court stated that where a
defect in the product and misuse of the product were found to have been the proximate causes of the injuries, then "the trier of fact must then determine the respective
percentages (totalling 100%) by which these two concurring causes contributed to
bring about the event." Id at 352.
94. Id.The court said that the defense of misuse in a products liability suit
where defect and misuse combine to cause the injuries will only limit the plaintiff's
award to that portion of damages attributable to the defective product. Id This
comparative approach was not to be confused with the state's comparative negligence statute. Id Under the comparative negligence statute, a plaintiff could be
barred from recovering if he was more at fault than the defendant, while, in a products liability suit, the plaintiff's fault would not bar, but only reduce, his award. Id
The Texas comparative negligence statute reads:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any
person or party or the legal representative of any person or party to recover
the damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to persons or property if such negligence is not greater than the negligence of the person or
party or persons or parties against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributed to the person or party recovering.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1982-83).
95. 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981). The plaintiff was injured when a hose came in
contact with the throttle-control handle of a winch on which the plaintiff was standing. Id at 1302. This started the winch which then came in contact with plaintiff's
leg, and severed it above the knee. Id.The jury found that the design of the throttlecontrol valve was defective and that plaintiff misused the winch by standing on it. Id.
96. Id.at 1303. The state's comparative negligence statute reads as follows:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence or gross
negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence or gross negligence of the person
against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering. As used in this act, "contributory negligence" includes
"assumption of the risk."
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (1977).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984

17

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 4
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29: p. 695

other comparative principles would be applicable to strict liability. 9 7 Exercising its discretion, the Utah court decided to adopt a pure comparative
causation approach. 98 In the Third Circuit's Murray a. Fairbanks-Morse decision, 99 the court of appeals also adopted pure comparative principles, despite the existence of a modified comparative negligence statute in the
Virgin Islands. 100

In sharp contrast to these decisions, the West Virginia Supreme Court,
in Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., l01 held that its judicially-created
modified comparative negligence approach10 2 was applicable to strict products liability actions.' 0 3 The court rejected the pure comparative causation
approach taken by Texas and Utah because it believed that a party who
substantially contributes to his own damages should not be permitted to recover for any part of them. 10 4 New Hampshire courts, while applying a
comparative causation analysis, follow West Virginia in applying a modified
comparative approach to strict products liability, rather than a pure comparative approach. 0 5
97. 628 P.2d at 1303. The court made this determination in the context ofjury
findings that the defective product and the plaintiff's misuse contributed to the accident. Id. The court held that to relieve either party of responsibility would be inappropriate. Id The court reasoned that treating misuse as an absolute defense would
undermine the policy behind strict liability since the manufacturer would be relieved
of responsibility, while rejecting the defense completely would frustrate the policy
behind the defense of misuse since the manufacturer would bear the cost of an injury
caused by the user rather than the product. Id
98. Id The court held that misuse would not be a complete bar but would only
limit the plaintiff's recovery to that portion of the damages caused by the product
defect. Id. at 1303-04.
99. 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979). The plaintiff was severely injured while working on an electrical control panel when the cross member on which he was standing
gave way, causing the plaintiff to fall 10 feet. Id at 150-51. The jury returned a two
million dollar verdict for the plaintiff. Id at 150. The jury also found the plaintiff
five percent negligent. Id. Consequently, the trial judge reduced the award. Id
100. Id. at 159. The court first determined that the Virgin Island's modified
comparative negligence statute was not applicable because it was limited to negligence actions. Id. at 157. Therefore, the court found itself free to determine whether,
and what type of, comparative principles should apply to strict liability. Id at 15758. The court believed that a comparative fault approach was conceptually inappropriate. Id at 158-59. However, it believed a division could occur along lines of causation. Id. at 160. The court then determined that a pure system of comparative
causation could apply to strict products liability actions. Id at 162-63.
101. 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982). The plaintiff's store was damaged by fire
which allegedly was caused by a malfunction in a clock made by the defendant. Id
at 856. The defendant pleaded comparative negligence and assumption of the risk.
Id
102. The West Virginia Supreme Court had adopted a modified system of comparative negligence under which a party was not barred from recovering so long as
his fault was not greater than or equal to the defendant's. Bradley v. Appalachian
Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
103. 297 S.E.2d at 862.
104. Id
105. See Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978).
For a discussion of Thibaul, see notes 169-71 and accompanying text itfra.
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B.

Court Decisions Opposing the Application

Six courts have held that comparative principles are inapplicable to
strict products liability actions. In Kirkland v. General Motors Corp.,' 0 6 the

Supreme Court of Oklahoma adopted strict liability

0 7

and then determined

that the Oklahoma comparative negligence statute was not applicable to
strict liability causes of action because the statute was "specifically limited to
negligence actions." 10 8
The South Dakota Supreme Court, in Smith v. Smith, 109 also held that
comparative negligence was not applicable to strict liability."10 Noting that
a manufacturer's conduct is irrelevant in strict liability, the court reasoned
Simithat a plaintiff's contributory negligence should also be irrelevant."I'
larly, the First Circuit Court of Appeals, interpreting Rhode Island law,
ruled that comparative negligence did not apply to strict products liability. 1 12 The court explained that since contributory negligence was not a
defense in strict liability, comparative negligence should not be one

either. 113
In addition, courts in Colorado,"14 Nebraska,1

5

and Washington' 1 6 re-

106. 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974). In Kirkland, the plaintiff was involved in a
head-on collision with a car in another lane. Id. at 1356. The plaintiff alleged that
she lost control of her car due to a defect in her seat which caused her to fall backwards. Id The defendant manufacturer alleged plaintiff's contributory negligence in
speeding and driving while intoxicated as an affirmative defense. Id at 1357.
107. Id. at 1362. The court adopted the form of strict liability set out in § 402A
of the Restatement of Torts. Id
108. Id. at 1367 (emphasis in original). The court stated that strict liability was
not negligence but was a new theory of recovery. Id. Because the comparative negligence statute was inapplicable, the court determined that the plaintiff's driving while
intoxicated constituted an abnormal use or misuse of the product and was a total bar
to her suit. Id.
109. 278 N.W.2d 155 (S.D. 1979). The case involved injuries suffered by the
plaintiff when the fingers and thumb of his left hand were amputated by the blade of
a band saw. Id. at 156.
110. Id. at 161 n.7. The court believed that use of a "comparative fault" concept would present conceptual problems for a jury and would negate the policy reasons behind strict liability. Id
111. Id at 160-6 1. The court noted that fault concepts were abandoned in
products liability cases. d at 160. The manufacturer bore the damages caused by
his product, regardless of whether he was negligent or not. Id Consequently, since a
seller's negligence was immaterial, it would be inconsistent to consider a user's negligence. Id.
112. See Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denid, 440
U.S. 916 (1979).
113. Id at 1133-34. The court stated that contributory negligence was not a
defense in strict liability. Id at 1133 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A comment n (1965)).
114. See Kinard v. Coats Co., 37 Colo. App. 555, 553 P.2d 835 (1976).
115. See Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976) (interpreting
Nebraska law).
116. See Seay v. Chrysler Corp., 93 Wash. 2d 319, 609 P.2d 1382 (1980) (superseded by statute). For the text of the present Washington statute, see note 122 infra.
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fused to apply comparative principles to strict products liability actions.
However, these decisions were nullified when these states integrated the two
17
concepts through subsequent legislation.'
C.

Statutes Applying Comparative Prnci'les

Nine state legislatures have enacted statutes which make comparative
negligence principles applicable to strict products liability. In New York, a
pure comparative approach is applied "[i]n any action to recover damages
for personal injury, injury to property, or wrongful death." ' " 8
In three states, Colorado, 119 Connecticut,120 and Michigan, 12 1 the stat117. For a discussion of the Colorado, Nebraska, and Washington statutes
which apply comparative principles to strict products liability, see notes 119, 126 &
122, respectively, and accompanying text infra.
118. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAWS § 1411 (McKinney 1976). The statute provides:
In any action to recover damages for personal injury, injury to property, or wrongful death, the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant
or to the decedent, including contributory negligence or assumption of risk,
shall not bar recovery, but the amount of damages otherwise recoverable
shall be diminished in the proportion which the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant or decedent bears to the culpable conduct which caused
the damages.
Id The comments to the statute note that it applies to strict liability, warranty, and
negligence. Id at 386.
119. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-406 (Supp. 1983). Colorado's statute
provides:
In any product liability action, the fault of the person suffering the
harm, as well as the fault of all others who are parties to the action for
causing the harm, shall be compared by the trier of fact in accordance with
this section. The fault of the person suffering the harm shall not bar such
person, or a party bringing an action on behalf of such a person, or his
estate, or his heirs from recovering damages, but the award of damages to
such person or the party bringing the action shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of causal fault attributed to the person suffering the
harm. If any party is claiming damages for a decedent's wrongful death,
the fault of the decedent, if any, shall be imputed to such party.
Id
120. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-5720 (West Supp. 1984). The Connecticut statute reads:
In any claim under sections 38-370o, 52-240a, 52-240b, 52-572m to 52572r, inclusive, or 52-577a, the comparative responsibility of, or attributed
to, the claimant, shall not bar recovery but shall diminish the award of
compensatory damages proportionately, according to the measure of responsibility attributed to the claimant.
Id Section 52-572n includes under the term "product liability claims" actions in
negligence, warranty, and strict liability. Id.§ 52-572n.
121. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2949 (West Supp. 1984-85). The
Michigan statute provides:
In all products liability actions brought to recover damages resulting
from death or injury to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may
have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery by the
plaintiff or the plaintiff's legal representatives, but damages sustained by
the plaintiff shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributed to the plaintiff.
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utes provide that a pure comparative analysis is specifically applicable to
products liability actions and claims. In Washington, the statute applies to
claims based on "fault," and the term is defined to include strict liability. 122
Four states apply modified forms of comparative negligence to strict
products liability. Both Arkansas' 2 3 and Maine 12 4 apply comparative principles to reduce a plaintiff's award so long as the plaintiff's fault is less than
that of the defendant's. Indiana will reduce an award utilizing comparative
122. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.005 (West Supp. 1984-85). Washington's statute reads:
In an action based on fault seeking to recover damages for injury or
death to person or harm to property, any contributory fault chargeable to
the claimant diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages for an injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault,
but does not bar recovery. This rule applies whether or not under prior law
the claimant's contributory fault constituted a defense or was disregarded
under applicable legal doctrines, such as last clear chance.
1d. Another section defines fault as including acts or omissions which subject a person to a products liability claim or strict tort liability. Id. § 4.22.015.
123. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (1979). As used in the act,
"fault" includes any act or omission which is a breach of a legal duty. Id § 27-1763.
The statute then provides:
In all actions for damages for personal injuries or wrongful death or
injury to property in which recovery is predicated upon fault, liability shall
be determined by comparing the fault chargeable to a claiming party with
the fault chargeable to the party or parties from whom the claiming party
seeks to recover damages.
Id § 27-1764.
If the fault chargeable to a party claiming damages is of less degree
than the fault chargeable to the party or parties from whom the claiming
party seeks to recover damages, then the claiming party is entitled to recover the amount of his damages after they have been diminished in proportion to the degree of his own fault. If the fault chargeable to a party
claiming damages is equal to or greater in degree than any fault chargeable
to the party or parties from whom the claiming party seeks to recover damages, then the claiming party is not entitled to recover such damages.
Id. § 27-1765.
124. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1980). The Maine comparative
negligence statute provides as follows:
Where any person suffers death or damage as a result partly of his own
fault and partly of the fault of any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that death or damage shall not be defeated by reason of the fault of
the person suffering the damage, but the damages recoverable in respect
thereof shall be reduced to such extent as the jury thinks just and equitable
having regard to the claimant's share in the responsibility for the damage.
Where damages are recoverable by any person by virtue of this section,
subject to such reduction as is mentioned, the court shall instruct the jury to
find and record the total damages which would have been recoverable if the
claimant had not been at fault, and further instruct the jury to reduce the
total damages by dollars and cents, and not by percentage, to the extent
deemed just and equitable, having regard to the claimant's share in the
responsibility for the damages, and instruct the jury to return both amounts
with the knowledge that the lesser figure is the final verdict in the case.
Fault means negligence, breach of statutory duty or other act or omis-
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principles so long as the plaintiffs fault is not greater than that of the defendant. 12 5 Nebraska will invoke comparative principles to reduce damages
in a strict products liability suit so long as the plaintiffs negligence is only
slight. 126
In addition, comparative principles have been included in model acts
and proposed legislation. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act would apply
pure comparative principles to products liability cases.' 27 Under the Model
sion which gives rise to a liability in tort or would, apart from this section,
give rise to the defense of contributory negligence.
If such claimant is found by the jury to be equally at fault, the claimant shall not recover.
Id.
125. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-33-2 to 34-4-33-4 (West Supp. 1983-84). The
Indiana statute includes strict tort liability in its definition of fault. Id § 34-4-33-2.
The statute then provides:
In an action based on fault, any contributory fault chargeable to the
claimant diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory
damages for an injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault, but
does not bar recovery except as provided in section 4 of this chapter.
Id § 34-4-33-3.
In an action based on fault that is brought against:
(1) one (1) primary defendant; or
(2) two (2) or more defendants who may be treated as a single party;
the claimant is barred from recovery if his contributory fault is greater than
the fault of all persons whose fault proximately contributed to the claimant's damages.
Id § 34-4-33-4.
126. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1979). The Nebraska statute states:
In all actions brought to recover damages for injuries to a person or to his
property caused by the negligence or act or omission giving rise to strict
liability in tort of another, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty
of contributory negligence shall not bar recovery when the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff was slight and the negligence or act or omission
giving rise to strict liability in tort of the defendant was gross in comparison,
but the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall be considered by the
jury in the mitigation of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence attributable to the plaintiff; and all questions of negligence
or act or omission giving rise to strict liability in tort and contributory negligence shall be for the jury.
Id
127. See Wade, Products Liability and Plazntf's Fault-The Uniform Comparative
Fault Act, 29 MERCER L. REV. 373, 392 (1978) (the appendix contains a copy of the
Act). Section 1 of the Act provides:
In an action based on fault seeking to recover damages for injury or
death to person or harm to property, any contributory fault chargeable to
the claimant diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages for an injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault,
but does not bar recovery. This rule applies whether or not under prior law
the claimant's contributory fault constituted a defense or was disregarded
under applicable legal doctrines, such as last clear chance.
"Fault" includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or
reckless toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject
a person to strict tort liability. The term also includes breach of warranty,
unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an enforceable express
consent, misuse of a product for which the defendant otherwise would be
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Uniform Product Liability Act, pure comparative principles would be applied through a comparative responsibility approach.12 Presently, Congress
is considering a products liability bill which would also supply a pure com1 29
parative responsibility approach to products liability actions.
D.

Courts Applvying Comparative PrincipIes to Warranty Actions

A limited number of courts have considered the application of comparative principles to warranty actions. For example, the Supreme Court of
Florida addressed this issue in West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. 130 Although
adopting the doctrine of strict tort liability, 13 1 the court stated that if the
plaintiff was in a contractual relationship with the manufacturer, he could
liable, and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages.
Legal requirements of causal relation apply both to fault as the basis for
liability and to contributory fault.
Id
128. See MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714
(1979). Section 111 of the Act provides:
All claims under this Act shall be governed by the principles of comparative responsibility. In any claim under this Act, the comparative responsibility of, or attributed to, the claimant shall not bar recovery but
shall diminish the award of compensatory damages proportionately, according to the measure of responsibility attributed to the claimant.
Id at 62,734. Under comparative responsibility, four types of plaintiff misconduct
will reduce a plaintiff's award: 1) failure to discover a defect, 2) use of a known
defective product, 3) misuse of a product, and 4) alteration of the product. Elfin, The
Changing Philosophy of Products Liability and the ProposedModel Uniform Product Liabil'ty
Act, 19 AM. Bus. L.J. 267, 274 (1981). For discussion of the Act in general, see Dworkin, Product Liabiity Reform andthe Model Uniform Product Liabtiity Act, 60 NEB. L. REv.
50 (1981); Schwartz, The Uniform Product Liability Act-A Brief Overview, 33 VAND. L.
REV. 579 (1980).
129. See S. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9(a); Product Liability Act. Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on the Consumer of the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 20 (1983). The Act provides:
All claims under this Act shall be governed by the principles of comparative responsibility. Comparative responsibility attributed to the claimant's
conduct under section 10(c) shall not bar recovery in a product liability
action, but shall reduce any damages awarded to the claimant in an
amount proportionate to the responsibility of the claimant.
Id Conduct of the plaintiff constituting negligence, contributory negligence, or assumption of the risk would be considered in the comparison. Id § 10(c).
130. 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976). The suit was brought by the deceased's husband
as administrator of the decedent's estate. Id at 82. The decedent died of massive
internal injuries she incurred when run over by the wheel of a Caterpillar grader. Id.
She unknowingly walked into the path of the grader as it was travelling in reverse.
Id at 82-83. The plaintiff alleged negligent design of the grader by failure to provide
an adequate warning system for use while travelling in reverse, by failure to provide
adequate rear view mirrors, and by manufacturing the grader with a blind spot while
driving in reverse. Id at 82. The plaintiff also alleged a breach of implied warranty
or strict liability. Id The defendant asserted the plaintiff's contributory negligence
as a defense. Id at 83.
131. Id at 87. The West court adopted the form of strict liability as stated in
Section 402A of the Restatement. Id
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still bring an action in implied warranty.1 32 The West court then found that
comparative negligence principles would be applicable to implied warranty
actions,' 33 reasoning that evidence of a plaintiff's negligence would tend to
show that his injuries were not caused by the breach of warranty but, rather,
134
by his own lack of due care.
In addition to the West court, the Supreme Courts of Alaska 135 and
Kansas 136 have determined that comparative principles are applicable to
warranty actions. Furthermore, many state statutes and model acts which
apply comparative principles to strict products liability actions apply these
37
principles to actions in warranty.
E.

An Analysts of the Apph'cation of Comparative Negh'gence Prlnciples

At present, excluding the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Court
132. Id at 91. The court stated that the adoption of strict liability did not mean
that implied warranty was no longer available. Id. Rather, strict tort liability was
available if a user was injured by a defective product and did not have a contractual
relationship with the manufacturer. Id. However, if the contractual relationship did
exist, the court stated that an implied warranty action could still be brought. Id
133. Id at 92. The court stated that if the injueed person's acts of contributory
negligence were a proximate cause of the injuries, then comparative negligence
would apply. Id. The court noted that contributory negligence is generally considered a tort concept. Id at 91. Breach of warranty, according to the court, retained
some tort concepts. Id The court then stated:
It would seem at first glance that there is no room for operation of any of
the principles of the law of negligence in a purely contractual area. But
when it is considered that liability for breach of warranty exists only where
it is shown that the breach was the proximate cause of the harm for which
recovery is sought, the question arises whether evidence which, in a negligence suit, might be introduced as showing the injured person's contributory negligence, may not be introduced in a breach of warranty action to
show that the harm alleged to flow from a breach of warranty actually was
otherwise caused.
Id (quoting 1 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
619-21 (2d Ed. 1974)).
134. 336 So.2d at 92. The court noted, however, that due care did not require a
plaintiff to make detailed, expert inspection of a product. Id In addition, the court
noted that unreasonable exposure to a known risk would remain an absolute defense.

Id.
The court also indicated that comparative negligence was applicable to strict
liability. Id. However, failure of the user to discover a defect or guard against its
existence was not to be considered contributory negligence. Id
135. See Sebring v. Colver, 649 P.2d 932, 935 (Alaska 1982).

136. See Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618 P.2d 788 (1980).
137. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 1763-1765 (1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21406 (Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN, STAT. ANN. § 52-5720 (West Supp. 1983-84); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-33-2 to 34-4-33-4 (West Supp. 1983-84); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14 § 156 (1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2949 (West Supp. 1983-84); N.Y.
CIV. PRAC. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.05 (Supp.
1983-84); Uniform Comparative Fault Act § 1, in Wade, supra note 127; Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,734 (1979); S. 44, supra note 129,
§ 9(a). For the text of these statutes and acts, see notes 118-25 & 127-29 respectively,
and accompanying text supra.
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in Correia v. Firestone Tire &Rubber Co., 138 twenty-six states apply comparative
principles to strict liability either through judicial decision 139 or by statute,14° while only three states expressly refuse to make the application.14' In
addition, eleven states apply comparative principles to warranty actions,
42
while no state has explicitly refused such an application.'
It is submitted that the California Supreme Court, in Dal v. General
Motors Corp., thoroughly analyzed why comparative principles are compatible with strict products liability.143 The court correctly noted that the application of comparative principles would not undermine the policy behind
strict liability of relieving the plaintiff of the burden of proof found in a
negligence case. 144 The defendant manufacturer would continue to be
strictly liable for the defective product, while the plaintiff's conduct would
145
only be considered in reducing the award.
Strict liability is also based on the policy that its imposition will serve to
deter a manufacturer from placing a defective product on the market.' 46 As
138. 388 Mass. 342, 446 N.E.2d 1033 (1983). For a discussion of Correia, see
notes 188-202 and accompanying text infra.
139. For a discussion of the courts which have applied comparative principles to
strict liability, see notes 46-105 and accompanying text supra.
140. For a discussion of statutes which have made comparative principles applicable to strict liability, see notes 118-29 and accompanying text supra.
141. For a discussion of the courts which refused to apply comparative principles to strict liability, see notes 106-17 and accompanying text supra.
142. For a discussion of the court decisions and statutes which have made comparative principles applicable to warranty actions, see notes 130-37 and accompanying text supra.
143. For a general discussion of the Daly decision, see notes 52-63 and accompanying text supra.
144. For a discussion of the Daly court's view of the effect of the application of
comparative principles on the policy behind strict liability of relieving the plaintiff of
proving a manufacturer's negligence, see notes 56 & 58 and accompanying text supra.
145. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, 555 P.2d 42, 45-46 (Alaska
1976) (defendant's liability remains strict, plaintiff's liability attaches as a result of his
conduct in using the product). See Levine, Buyer's Conduct as Afftcing the Extent of
Manufacturer's Liability in Warranty, 52 MINN. L. REV. 627, 648 (1968) (though manufacturer is held strictly liable without proof of his negligence, he should not be liable
for the fault of someone else); Noel, Defective Products.: Abnormal Use, Contrnbutoy Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REv. 93, 110-11 (1972) (since contributory
negligence bars or diminishes recovery under negligence per se and res ipsa loquitor
theories where defendant's negligence may not be provable, contributory negligence
should arguably bar or diminish recovery under strict liability); Twerski, The Use and
Abuse of Comparative Neghgence in Products Liability, 10 IND. L. REV. 797, 799 (1977)
("To the extent that strict liability merely reflects a belief that in a product defect
case the defendant is guilty of non-provable negligence, then there is no justification
for limiting the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the
risk"). But see Comment, supra note 52, at 499, 500 (Daly effectively requires the
plaintiff to prove the defendant manufacturer's negligence in order to preclude jury
from being influenced by defense counsel's characterization of a "seemingly harmless" defective product).
146. See Wade, supra note 35, at 826 (if manufacturer knows it will be liable for
injuries inflicted by its product, it is likely that product will be safer than if manufacturer knows it can escape liability by merely showing due care).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984

25

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 4
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29: p. 695

the Daly court noted, the application of comparative principles will not seriously undermine this policy since the manufacturer will remain liable for
injuries caused by the defective product. In those instances where a plaintiff's negligent conduct also contributes to the accident, the manufacturer's
liability will only be lessened. ' 47 In addition, the application of comparative
principles may deter the negligent use of products by consumers.' 48 This
policy seems desirable since a plaintiff's reasonable use of a defective product
may help to avoid, or at least lessen the extent of, an injury.149 Thus, it is
submitted that the application cf comparative principles will continue to
deter a manufacturer from manufacturing defective products and, simultaneously, will encourage due care by consumers in the use of these
products. ' 50
It is further submitted that the Daly court was correct in finding that
juries will be capable of applying comparative principles to actions in strict
liability. 15 1 With the aid of proper instruction from the judge, juries can
properly make such an application just as they are able to resolve other com52
plex questions. '
147. For a discussion of the Daly court's reasons why a manufacturer would continue to be deterred from building unsafe products, see note 61 supra.
148. See Epstein, Plainif's Conduct in Products Liability Actions: Comparative Negligence, Automatic Divison and Multiple Parties, 45 J. AIR L. & COMM. 87, 104 (1979)

(recognition that their recoveries will be diminished or barred likely to deter careless
conduct of consumers). But see Wright, supra note 36, at 118 (if fear of injury does not
prevent carelessness, unlikely that possible reduction in jury award will).
149. See Epstein, supra note 148, at 105-06 (at time of use, plaintiff has possession
and control of product and possesses information regarding the immediate environment in which the product operates); Comment, supra note 52, at 496-97 (a plaintiff
who does not wear a seat belt or drives while intoxicated is not "powerless to protect
himself").
150. See Pinto, ComparativeResponsibiity-An Idea Whose Times Has Come, 45 INS.

COUNS. J. 115, 119 (1978) ("Is not society better served by encouraging due care and
prudence on the part of every consumer and user, rather than absolving an individual for conduct which caused or contributed to the accident

. . .?");

Plant, supra note

36, at 416 (desirable for general social welfare to encourage due care on part of consumers as well as manufacturers); Note, Assumption of Risk and Strict Products Liability,
95 HARV. L. REV. 872, 883 (1982) (manufacturer's defenses in strict liability should

be structured to provide incentives for care on part of consumers and manufacturers).
151. For a discussion of the Daly court's determination that juries are capable of
applying comparative principles to strict liability, see note 62 and accompanying text
supra.

152. See Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 748,
(1978) (Clark, J., concurring) (jury's
product is no more difficult than
SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 208-09

575 P.2d at 1175-76, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 393-94
comparison of a negligent act and a defective
its comparison of two negligent acts); V.
(jury difficulty in apportioning fault is more

conceptual than practical). But see Beasley & Tunstall,Jury Instructions ConcerningMultiple Defendants and Strict Liability After the Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act, 24
VILL. L. REV. 518, 535 (1978-79) (too demanding to ask jurors not to consider de-

fendant's conduct in imposing strict liability, but then to consider it in assessing damages); Westra, Restructuring the Defenses to Strict Products Liabiity-An Alternative to
ComparativeNegligence, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 355, 379 (1979) ("[j]ury verdicts will

be haphazard, unpredictable, and will of necessity bear little relationship to an equitable apportionment of damages").
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Since comparative principles are compatible with strict liability, it is
urged that courts reject the theory that the principles underlying compara153
tive negligence statutes be limited in application to negligence actions.
Rather, as numerous authorities have indicated, courts should view these
statutes as inviting judicial action. 154 Under this approach, the existence of
a comparative negligence statute is an expression of the legislature's intention to apportion the cost of injuries among all the responsible parties. 155
Therefore, courts should extend the principles beyond negligence to strict
56
products liability in accordance with the legislative will. 1
This judicial activist role may be supported by two lines of argument.
First, the comparative negligence statute may have been drafted prior to the
state's adoption of strict liability.' 57 Consequently, one may argue that the
legislature never considered the question of whether the statute would be
applicable to strict liability.1 58 Based on this line of reasoning, a court may
153. See, e.g., Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795, 802 (8th Cir. 1976) (examining Nebraska comparative negligence statute) (due to its language, application of
statute would be "inappropriate in a strict liability case"); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974) (comparative negligence statute specifically
limited to negligence; not applicable to strict liability).
154. See, e.g., V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 195-96; Razook, Merging Comparative Fault and Strict Products Liabilio: The Case for Judicial Innovation, 20 AM. Bus. L.J.
511 (1983); Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negligence, 42 TENN. L. REV. 171,
179-80 (1974); Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinkng Some Product Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 297, 330-31 (1977); Wade, supranote 127, at
380; Westerbeke & Meltzer, ComparativeFault and Strict Products Liability in Kansas. Reflections on the Distinction Between Initial Liability and Ultimate Loss Allocaton, 28 U. KAN.

L.

25, 44-45 (1979).
155. See Sun Valley Airlines v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598, 603 (D.
Idaho 1976) (rationale behind comparative negligence statute is to allocate loss
among all legal causes of the plaintiff's injuries).
156. See Twerski, supra note 154, at 330-3 1.
[F]or a state with a long history of comparative negligence in which the
various and sundry intricacies of the doctrine have been worked out to refuse to adopt comparative fault when faced with strict liability is almost
ludicrous. The legislative will is clear. The implementation mechanism for
the reduction of plaintiff's verdict is well established. If ever a court had the
right to extend by analogy without waiting for further legislation on the
subject, this would appear the appropriate occasion.
REV.

Id See also Note, Comparative Negligence in a Strict Product Liablity Action. Sun Valley
Airlines Corp. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 14 IDAHO L. REV. 723, 735 (1978) (though court

may feel timid about treading on the legislative domain, the court has a duty to
correct injustice and inequity).
157. See, e.g., Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740, 751 (D.
Kan. 1978) ("Kansas legislature passed [comparative negligence statute] two years
before the Kansas Supreme Court's endorsement of [strict tort liability]"); Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676, 681 (D.N.H. 1972) ("At the time of
the passage of the comparative negligence statute, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court had not yet adopted the doctrine of strict liability.").
158. See Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676, 682 (D.N.H.
1972) ("I may also conjecture that the legislature never considered the problem at all,
which is most likely.

.

."); Westerbeke & Meltzer, supra note 154, at 41-42 (compara-

tive negligence statute meant to solve problems related to negligence actions; legislature never considered its application to other subject matter).
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be justified in expanding the statute's application to the more recently developed theory of strict liability.159
A second line of argument derives from the interrelated roles of the legislature and the judiciary in the development of strict liability. As one commentator has noted, the legislature, in enacting a comparative negligence
statute, has promoted a general comparative analysis for determining recovery in tort. 16° The judiciary, meanwhile, as creator of the strict liability
cause of action, 16 ' has inherent authority to shape the theory in accord with
the legislative will.' 62 Consequently, the courts may adopt the general comparative analysis underlying the comparative negligence statute and apply it
to strict liability and, at the same time, be free to determine whether a pure
form of comparative analysis or a modified form of comparative analysis will
63
be applied. 1
It is submitted that the Texas Supreme Court in GeneralMotors Corp. v.
65
Hopkins16 4 and the Utah Supreme Court in Mulhertn v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. 1
properly followed this approach in extending comparative principles to strict
products liability. In each instance, the court applied a pure form of comparative analysis, even though the state had previously enacted a modified
comparativenegligence statute.' 66 The actions taken by the Texas and
Utah Supreme Courts find support among many commentators who agree
159. See Schwartz, supra note 154, at 180 (since legislature has not prohibited the
use of comparative negligence in strict liability, court should apply it where reason
and policy dictate).
160. See Wade, supra note 127, at 380 (through comparative negligence statute,
"legislature ha[s] expressed the general policy of the state, alleviation of an all-ornothing rule").
161. The vast majority of states which have adopted strict liability have done so
through judicial decision. For a discussion of the states which have adopted strict
liability, see notes 42-44 and accompanying text supra. Even in those states where
strict liability is imposed through legislative enactment, courts develop the theory
through interpretation of the statutes. Colley & Thomas, supra note 1, at 58. For a
critical analysis of the judiciary's infatuation with the strict tort theory of products
liability, see Shanker, A Case ofjudicial Chutzpah (The JudialAdoption of Strict Tort

Products Liability Theog), 11 AKRON L. REV. 697 (1978).
162. See Razook, supra note 154, at 519. This commentator notes that, by passing a comparative negligence statute, the legislature has demonstrated its approval of
comparative analysis, and has provided some guidance in its application. Id
163. Id Since strict products liability theory was created by the judiciary, the
courts can refine and develop the theory consistent with the general legislative intent
that a comparative analysis should apply. Id
164. 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977), overruled on other grounds, Turner v. General
Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979). For a discussion of Hopkins, see notes 9294 and accompanying text supra.
165. 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981). For a discussion of Mulherth, see notes 95-98
and accompanying text supra.
166. See Razook, supra note 154, at 521 (discussing Hopkins and Mulherin). In
both instances, the courts viewed the existence of comparative negligence statutes as
justifying the application of comparative analysis to strict liability. Id However, the
courts did not feel bound to apply the modified comparative approach of the statutes
since they were literally not applicable; rather, the courts preferred to implement a
pure comparative approach. Id
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that pure and not modified comparative principles are most compatible with
the policies underlying strict liability. 167
Courts and commentators have stated that the application of modified
comparative principles to strict products liability will create unjust results.
If a court applies the approach embodied in a modified comparative negligence statute in a situation where the plaintiff is slightly more at fault than
the defendant, then the plaintiff will be completely barred from recovery.168
16 9
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
implicitly approved this result. The court first adopted a comparative causation approach for strict liability that was patterned after the state's modified
comparative negligence statute. 170 The court then explained that the plain167. See id at 520-23 (courts should not be constrained by comparative negligence statutes which are inappropriate for strict products liability; instead, courts
should adopt pure comparative fault defense); Westerbeke & Meltzer, supra note 154,
at 45 (judicial adoption of comparative fault, rather than application of comparative
negligence statute, would provide courts with more freedom in seeking to achieve
greater flexibility between principles of comparative fault and policies underlying
strict liability). But see Greenlee & Rochelle, supra note 33, at 666-67. The authors
prefer to see judicial adoption of a modified comparative fault approach to strict
liability because (1) the legislature's modified statute expresses public policy on the
issue and (2) using the same approach as in negligence will avoid confusion in multiple theory and multiple party cases. Id
168. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West Supp. 1984-85) (contributory negligence bars recovery unless "such negligence was not greater than the
total amount of negligence attributable to the person or persons against whom recovery is sought"); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (Purdon 1982) (contributory negligence shall bar recovery by the plaintiff unless "such negligence was not greater than
the causal negligence of the defendant or defendants against whom recovery is
sought").

169. 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978). The plaintiff sued a lawnmower manufacturer to recover damages for an injury to his foot. Id at 805, 395 A.2d at 845.
The plaintiff's foot became lodged under the housing of the mower when the plaintiff
fell while mowing a steep slope. Id He alleged that the product lacked a guard
which would prevent a foot from slipping under the housing. Id The defendant
manufacturer claimed the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in mowing slopes up
and down, instead of lengthwise, as was illustrated in the instructor's manual. Id at
806, 395 A.2d at 845.
170. Id at 813, 395 A.2d at 850. The jury was to compare the causal effect of
the defect in the product with the causal misconduct of the plaintiff. Id
The New Hampshire comparative negligence statute provides:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any plaintiff, or his legal representative, to recover damages for negligence resulting
in death, personal injury, or property damage, if such negligence was not
greater than the causal negligence of the defendant, but the damages
awarded shall be diminished, by general verdict, in proportion to the
amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff; provided that where recovery is allowed against more than one defendant, each such defendant shall
be liable for that proportion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages
in the ratio of the amount of his causal negligence to the amount of causal
negligence attributed to all defendants against whom recovery is allowed.
The burden of proof as to the existence or amount of causal negligence
alleged to be attributable to a party shall rest upon the party making such
allegation.

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (1983).
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tiff would be barred from any recovery if his injuries were caused more by
his own conduct than the defective product. 1 7' Such a result, it is submitted, directly contradicts the purpose of imposing strict liability since a defendant manufacturer is completely absolved of liability for an injury which
172
was caused in part by his product.
The application of modified comparative principles will also create unfair results in multiple defendant cases. For example, in Jack Frost, Inc. v.
Engtieered Bulding Components Co., 17 3 the Minnesota Supreme Court found
that the plaintiff was more at fault than one defendant but less than another. 1 74 Through application of the state's modified comparative negligence statute, 175 the first defendant was relieved of liability while the second
76
defendant was required to bear the burden of both defendants' liability. 1

It is submitted that the better approach consists of applying a pure comparative analysis to strict products liability so that each defendant, as well as
the plaintiff, will be legally responsible for that portion of the injury which
177
he or she caused.
171. 118 N.H. at 813, 395 A.2d at 850. The court stated that the plaintiff's
recovery must be reduced by the percentage that his "misconduct contributed to
cause his loss or injury so long as it is not greater than fifty percent." Id The court
further explained that if the plaintiff's conduct was "the sole cause or greater than
one-half the cause of the loss or injury, the verdict must be for the defendant." Id
The court held that there was sufficient evidence that the plaintiff was more than
50% responsible for the injuries to support the jury verdict in favor of the manufacturer. Id. at 814, 395 A.2d at 850.
172. For a discussion of the policy behind strict liability of placing the costs of
injuries caused by a defective product on the manufacturer, see note 36 and accompanying text supra. See also Note, Products Liability-Iestatement(Second) of Torts, Virgin
Islands ComparativeNegligence Statute Applied in Strict ProductsLiability Action, 25 VILL. L.
REV. 1072, 1080 (1980) (if plaintiff's "causal contribution" is more than 50% of the
cause of the injury, then harsh rule of contributory negligence is revived, and plaintiff
is totally barred from recovery).
173. 304 N.W.2d 346 (Minn. 1981). The plaintiff was engaged in the production and sale of chicken eggs. Id. at 348. The plaintiff's lawsuit arose when a chicken
barn collapsed. Id. The plaintiff sued EBCO, the retailer and manufacturer of the
barn, and EBCO impleaded Hydro-Air, the designer of the product. Id. at 348-49.
174. Id. at 352. The trial court found the plaintiff 30% negligent, EBCO 15% at
fault, and Hydro-Air 55% at fault. Id
175. Id. The court noted that the statute was applicable to claims based on strict
products liability. Id n.5. In 1981, the Minnesota comparative negligence statute
provided as follows:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any
person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as
great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but
any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount
of negligence attributable to the person recovering.
MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1 (1976).
176. 304 N.W.2d at 352. Since the plaintiff's negligence was greater than the
fault of EBCO, EBCO was not liable to the plaintiff. Id. at 352 n.5. However, because the injury was indivisible, Hydro-Air was assessed 70% of the costs of the injury.
Id at 352.
177. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d, 725, 742, 575 P.2d 1162,
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MASSACHUSETTS' REFUSAL TO MAKE THE APPLICATION

A.

Correia v. Firestone Tire & Manufacturing Co.

In 1958, the Massachusetts Legislature adopted the warranty provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code1 78 in order to alleviate the difficult burdens of proof which plaintiffs bore in negligence actions.1 79 In 1970, by
amendment, the legislature made disclaimers of warranties regarding consumer goods and services unenforceable. 80 Through subsequent legislative
action, Massachusetts passed additional laws which were designed to protect
1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 390 (1978) (preferable to apportion legal responsibility so
that one party does not bear a loss " 'for which two are, by hypothesis, responsible' ")
(quoting W. PROSSER, supra note 11, § 67, at 433).
178. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106,

§§

2-313 to -315 (West 1958). Massa-

chusetts' provisions regarding express warranty, implied warranty of
merchantability, and implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose are identical to the provisions in the Uniform Commercial Code. For the text of these provisions in the Uniform Commercial Code, see note 32 supra.
179. See Note, supra note 32, at 241-42. For a discussion of problems concerning
the burden of proof in negligence actions, see note 33 and accompanying text supra.
In Massachusetts, it had long been established that a plaintiff could sue in negligence for injuries caused by a defective product. Note, supra note 32, at 241 (citing,
inter alia, Burke v. Hodge, 217 Mass. 182, 104 N.E. 450 (1914) (defendant's negligent
mixing of cement proximately caused a concrete wall to fall and injure plaintiff)).
The requirement of privity of contract to sue in negligence had been eliminated in
Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946). However, a plaintiff
still had three difficult burdens of proof. Note, supra note 32, at 240. First, the plaintiff had to prove that the product was defective when it left the manufacturer's control. Id (citing Coyne v. Tilley Co., 368 Mass. 230, 318 N.E.2d 623 (1974); Kenney v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 355 Mass. 604, 246 N.E.2d 649 (1969); Farley v. Edward E.
Tower & Co., 271 Mass. 230, 171 N.E. 639 (1930)). Second, the plaintiff had to prove
that the defect was caused by the manufacturer's negligence. Id.at 240 (citing Carter
v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 96, 64 N.E.2d 693, 696 (1946)). Third, the plaintiff
had to prove that the defect caused his injuries. Id at 240 (citing Carney v. Bereault,
348 Mass. 502, 204 N.E.2d 448 (1965); Potter v. John Bean Div. of Food Mach. &
Chem. Corp., 344 Mass. 420, 182 N.E.2d 834 (1962); Ruffin v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 311 Mass. 514, 42 N.E.2d 259 (1942)).
180. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106,

§ 2-316A

(West Supp. 1984-85). That

provision reads as follows:
The provisions of section 2-316 shall not apply to sales of consumer goods,
services or both. Any language, oral or written, used by a seller or manufacturer of consumer goods and services, which attempts to exclude or modify
any implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose or to exclude or modify the consumer's remedies for breach of those
warranties, shall be unenforceable.
Any language, oral or written, used by a manufacturer of consumer
goods, which attempts to limit or modify a consumer's remedies for breach
of such manufacturer's express warranties, shall be unenforceable, unless
such manufacturer maintains facilities within the commonwealth sufficient
to provide reasonable and expeditious performance of the warranty obligations.
The provisions of this section may not be disclaimed or waived by
agreement.

1d Section 2-316 permitted exclusion or modification of warranties in limited circumstances and with specific language. See id § 2-316.
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the consumer. Thus, the legislature extended liability to lessors and suppliers of goods, limited the defense of failure to give notice to cases where the
defendant could show prejudice, and enacted a three-year statute of limitations for personal injuries which ran from the date of injury, not the date of
sale of the product.' 8 ' As a result of these developments, the Supreme Judicial Court considered Massachusetts' warranty law to be as comprehensive a
remedy for injured plaintiffs as strict tort liability. Consequently, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court refused to adopt section 402A in the 1978
8 2
twin cases of Back v. W'ces Corp.' and Swartz v. GeneralMotors Corp.183
In the 1824 case of Smith v. Smith,' 84 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was the first state court to adopt the contributory negligence defense.' 8 5 In 1969, the Massachusetts Legislature replaced contributory
negligence with comparative negligence.18 6 Although the Supreme Judicial
181. Id § 2-318. Section 2-318 provides as follows:
Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense in
any action brought against the manufacturer, seller, lessor or supplier of
goods to recover damages for breach of warranty, express or implied, or for
negligence, although the plaintiff did not purchase the goods from the defendant if the plaintiff was a person whom the manufacturer, seller, lessor
or supplier might reasonably have expected to use, consume or be affected
by the goods. The manufacturer, seller, lessor or supplier may not exclude
or limit the operation of this section. Failure to give notice shall not bar
recovery under this section unless the defendant proves that he was
prejudiced thereby. All actions under this section shall be commenced
within three years next after the date the injury and damage occurs.
Id
182. 375 Mass. 633, 378 N.E.2d 964 (1978). The Back court noted that warranty
liability had been transformed into a remedy as comprehensive as strict liability. Id
at 639, 378 N.E.2d at 968. It was no longer encumbered by sales and contract law.
Id at 640, 378 N.E.2d at 969. Rather, it was "congruent in nearly all respects with
the principles expressed in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965)." Id.
183. 375 Mass. 628, 378 N.E.2d 61 (1978). The Swartz court declined to adopt
strict tort liability. Id at 631, 378 N.E.2d at 64. The court noted that amendments
to Massachusetts warranty law had made it "a remedy as comprehensive as that
provided by § 402A of the Restatement .
" Id at 630, 378 N.E.2d at 63 (footnote
omitted).
184. 19 Mass. 662 (1824). The case concerned an injury to the plaintiffs horse
allegedly caused by a woodpile, which the defendant had placed in the road. Id.The
plaintiff had loaded a wagon with cider. Id The wagon rammed the horse, causing
the horse to gallop furiously. Id.at 663. The wagon then struck the woodpile and
broke, causing injury to the horse. Id.The plaintiff claimed there would have been
no accident if the wood had not been in the way. Id The defendant countered that
the plaintiff was negligent in overloading the wagon and not driving skillfully. Id
185. Id at 664. The court held that the plaintiff could not recover unless he
showed he used ordinary care. Id The court reasoned that where the complaining
party was negligent, it could not be ascertained whether his injury was caused by
himself or the fault of another. Id As precedent, the court cited Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809). 19 Mass. at 665. For a discussion of
Butterfield, see notes 13-14 and accompanying text supra.
186. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West Supp. 1984-85). The Massachusetts modified comparative negligence statute provides as follows:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in any action by any person or legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in
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Court had not decided the issue, commentators predicted that Massachusetts
8 7
would apply comparative principles to warranty actions.'
In Correla v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 18 8 the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, in response to a question certified from the federal district
court, considered whether comparative negligence principles should apply to
a warranty action. At the outset, the court found that warranty law was
comparable to strict liability in Massachusetts 8 9 and, therefore, framed the
issue in terms of whether comparative principles should be applied to strict
liability.
Addressing this question, the court first determined that the state's comparative negligence statute' 90 did not apply because its language indicated
that it was limited to negligence actions.' 9 ' The court then refused to exdeath or in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not greater
than the total amount of negligence attributable to the person or persons
against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person
for whose injury, damage or death recovery is made. In determining by
what amount the plaintiffs damages shall be diminished in such a case, the
negligence of each plaintiff shall be compared to the total negligence of all
persons against whom recovery is sought. The combined total of the plaintiff's negligence taken together with all of the negligence of all defendants
shall equal one hundred percent.
The violation of a criminal statute, ordinance or regulation by a plaintiff which contributed to said injury, death or damage, shall be considered
as evidence of negligence of that plaintiff, but the violation of said statute,
ordinance or regulation shall not as a matter of law and for that reason
alone, serve to bar a plaintiff from recovery.
The defense of assumption of risk is hereby abolished in all actions
hereunder.
The burden of alleging and proving negligence which serves to diminish a plaintiffs damages or bar recovery under this section shall be upon the
person who seeks to establish such negligence, and the plaintiff shall be presumed to have been in the exercise of due care.
Id
187. See Note, supra note 32, at 258 (Massachusetts will follow national trend
applying comparative principles to products liability). See also MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 231, § 85 comment (West Supp. 1984-85) (statute will need amending so as
to be made applicable to warranty actions).
188. 388 Mass. 342, 446 N.E.2d 1033 (1983). The wrongful death action was
instituted by the wife of a truck driver whose husband was killed in an accident
resulting from a blowout in the right front tire of his truck. Id. at 343, 446 N.E.2d at
1033-34. The defendant alleged that the deceased was contributorily negligent in not
wearing a seat belt, not inspecting and maintaining the truck, and not controlling the
truck after the blowout. Id.at 344, 446 N.E.2d at 1034.
189. Id at 353, 446 N.E.2d at 1039 (citing Back v. Wickes Corp., 375 Mass. 633,
640, 378 N.E.2d 964, 969 (1978)). The court further noted that breach of warranty
claims sounded essentially in tort. 388 Mass. at 353, 446 N.E.2d at 1039 (citing
Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 386 Mass. 95, 99, 434 N.E.2d 1008, 1010 (1982); Back v.
Wickes Corp., 375 Mass. 633, 639-40, 378 N.E.2d 964, 969 (1978); Swartz v. General
Motors Corp., 375 Mass. 628, 630, 378 N.E.2d 61, 63 (1978)).
190. For the text of the statute, see note 186 supra.
191. 388 Mass. at 353, 446 N.E.2d at 1039. The court noted that the comparative negligence statute was only applicable to suits " 'by any person or legal represen-
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tend the principles underlying the Massachusetts comparative negligence
statute to strict liability actions.192 The court based this decision upon the
grounds that the policies underlying negligence liability differed radically
from those underlying strict liability. 193 Negligence presumed that people
would act reasonably. 194 Consequently, if a person's injuries were due in
part to his own unreasonable conduct, his recovery should be so limited.1 95
Strict liability, on the other hand, was based on the principle that the seller
is responsible for injuries caused by his product. 196 Therefore, a user's contributory negligence is irrelevant. 1 9 7 Due to these inconsistencies between
comparative principles and strict liability, the Massachussetts Supreme Judicial Court held that comparative negligence was not applicable to a breach
tative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or
property.'" Id (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, §85 (West Supp. 1984-85)).
The court then stated that actions in strict liability are not actions in negligence. 388
Mass. at 353, 446 N.E.2d at 1039 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 402A
comment n (1965)).
192. 388 Mass. at 354, 446 N.E.2d at 1039. The court noted that this was the
course of action argued most strenuously by the defendant. Id.
193. The court declined to meld comparative negligence principles with warranty theory because it believed that such an act would undercut the policies behind
warranty theory. Id
194. Id The court noted that the policies underlying negligence require that
people take reasonable steps to protect themselves and others from harm. Id.The
court stated that one whose conduct " 'falls below the standard established by law for
the protection of others against unreasonable risk' " could be held liable for resultant
injuries. Id.(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965)).
195. 388 Mass. at 354, 446 N.E.2d at 1039.
196. Id at 354-55, 446 N.E.2d at 1040. The court wrote:
On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability has been
said to be that the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public who may be injured by it; that the public has
the right to and does expect, in the case of products which it needs and for
which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand
behind their goods; that public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon
those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production against
which liability insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such
products is entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone,
and the proper persons to afford it are those who market the products.
Id (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965)).
The court noted that the seller was in the best position to insure product safety.
Id Consequently, he had a duty not to release " 'any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.' " Id.(quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l) (1965)). The court noted that the seller's duty was
unknown in the law of negligence and was not satisfied by the seller's being reasonable. Id at 355, 446 N.E.2d at 1040. Under warranty theory, liability centers on the
product, not the conduct of the seller. Id
197. Id at 356, 446 N.E.2d at 1040. The court noted that the seller and user are
not presumed to be equally responsible for injuries caused by a defective product. Id
Consequently, contributory negligence and comparative negligence have no part in a
strict liability scheme. Id
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of warranty action. 198

In declining to apply comparative principles, however, the court noted
that it would recognize a user's unreasonable assumption of the risk as a
defense because the user's conduct would be the cause of his own injuries. 199
For the same reason, the court noted that unforeseeable misuse of a product
would also constitute a valid defense. 2° ° In conclusion, the court stated that
any application of comparative principles to warranty should be left to legislative initiative. 20' The court did not believe that Massachusetts law was so
20 2
inconsistent with other jurisdictions that judicial action was required.
B.

A Critique of the Correia Decision

Initially, it is submitted that the Correiacourt was correct in looking to
the legislature for leadership in merging comparative principles and warranty. 20 3 Since warranty is a legislative creature, arguably it is the legislature which should shape and mold the theory. 20 4 In addition, since
warranty existed at the time the legislature adopted a comparative negligence statute, it may be argued that the legislature, by limiting the terms of
198. Id at 353, 446 N.E.2d at 1039. Besides finding that comparative fault was
inapplicable to a warranty action, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court also
determined that a third party tortfeasor could not seek contribution from an employer whose negligence contributed to the employee's injury, where the employee
received workmen's compensation benefits. Id. at 346-52, 446 N.E.2d at 1035-38.
199. Id at 355-56, 446 N.E.2d at 1040. The court stated that in strict liability, a
user's only duty was to act reasonably when proceeding with a known defective and
dangerous product. Id at 355, 446 N.E.2d at 1040. Consequently, if a user were to
proceed unreasonably, he would relinquish the law's protection and be barred from
recovery. Id. The court emphasized that recovery would be denied because the
user's conduct, and not the product, was the cause of his injuries, as a matter of law.
Id at 356, 446 N.E.2d at 1040.
200. Id. at 357 n.15, 446 N.E.2d at 1041 n.15. The court stated that a seller,
manufacturer, or distributor would not be liable for injuries caused by a plaintiff's
unforeseeable misuse of a product. Id. The court further stated that it was not the
defendant's burden to prove misuse; rather, as an element of his case, the plaintiff
had to prove that his injury was caused by a defect which made his product unfit for
ordinary use. Id
201. Id at 356, 446 N.E.2d at 1040-41. The court believed it was best to keep
the policies of negligence and warranty liability separate until the legislature decided
to meld them. Id, 446 N.E.2d at 1040. The court noted that, even if the Massachusetts law of warranty needed restructuring, the court would leave the restructuring
up to the legislature since a variety of possible solutions could be implemented. Id,
446 N.E.2d at 1041.
202. Id. at 356 n.14, 446 N.E.2d at 1041 n.14. The court stated that other courts
had also found comparative negligence incompatible with strict liability. Id (citing
Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976) (applying Nebraska law);
Kinard v. Coats Co., 37 Colo. App. 555, 553 P.2d 835 (1976); Smith v. Smith, 278
N.W.2d 155 (S.D. 1979)).
203. For a discussion of the Correta court's reluctance to act without legislative
guidance, see note 201 and accompanying text supra.
204. In Massachusetts, warranty law is governed by statute. MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 106, §§ 2-313 to -315 (West 1958). For a discussion of Massachusetts warranty law, see notes 178-81 and accompanying text supra.
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the statute to "negligence" actions, intended that it not apply to warranty
20 5

actions.
However, as the Correia court noted, warranty law in Massachusetts has
been developed so that it is nearly identical to the strict liability theory
found in most other states. 20 6 In fact, in analyzing whether comparative
principles should apply to warranty, the Correiacourt couched its analysis in
strict liability terminology. 20 7 Consequently, it is submitted that if the court
wished to continue to develop Massachusetts warranty law in conformity
with national trends in strict liability law, it should have applied compara20 8

tive principles to warranty.
The Correia court, in rejecting the application of comparative principles
to strict liability, reasoned that negligence principles were conceptually inappropriate in strict liability because negligence was based on a resonableness
standard, while in strict liability, reasonableness was irrelevant. 20 9 However,
it is submitted that these two theories are not as distinct as they might appear. Negligence terminology and the "reasonableness" standard are in fact
2 10
and scholars 2 1 ' when defining defectiveness for the purused by courts
205. Massachusetts adopted warranty in 1958. Note, supra note 32, at 247. The
Massachusetts comparative negligence statute was enacted in 1969. MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 comment (West Supp. 1984-85). For the text of the comparative negligence statutes, see note 186 supra.
206. For a history of the development of Massachusetts warranty laws, see notes
178-81 and accompanying text supra.
207. For a discussion of the Correiadecision, see notes 188-202 and accompanying text supra.
208. See Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 388 Mass. 342, 356 n. 14, 446
N.E.2d 1033, 1041 n. 14 (1983) (court would feel compelled to re-examine state law if
"out of harmony with the overwhelming weight of authority in other States") (citation omitted). For a discussion of the national trend towards applying comparative
principles to strict products liability, see notes 46-137 and accompanying text supra.
209. 388 Mass. at 354-55, 446 N.E.2d at 1039-40 (in negligence, reasonableness
standard is applied; in strict liability, reasonable conduct is irrelevant). See also Levine, Strict Products Liability and Comparative Negligence. The Colhsion of Fault and NoFault, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 337, 338 (1977) (since strict liability cause of action is
not based on fault, application of comparative negligence results in collision of fault
and no-fault concepts); Comment, Comparative Fault and Strict Products Liabilty." Are
They Compatible?, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 501, 507 (1978) (since the focus in strict
products liability is on the product, and the defendant's act and omissions are irrelevant, comparative negligence is not applicable). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, § 402A comment n (1965) (strict liability "isnot based upon negligence of
the seller").
It is also argued that because negligence and strict liability are based on different standards, there is no ground for comparison. See Elfin, supra note 128, at 270-71
(without a common denominator, jury forced to compare non-comparable concepts);
Case Comment, Products Liabii'ty-Mconduct by the Plaintiff Will Reduce or Eliminate
Damages Recoverablefrom a Seller or Manufacturer Under Strict Liability. Thibault v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1558, 1577 (1979) (because no correlative
element between strict liability and negligence theories, juries would be speculating
in comparing the two theories).
210. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033
(1974). The Oregon Supreme Court defined a dangerously defective product as:
One which a reasonable person would not put into the stream of commerce
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pose of determining liability under section 402A. In addition, some commentators believe that negligent conduct is inherent in the manufacture of a
2 12
defective product and may be inferred from the existence of the defect;
thus, the more serious the defect, the greater the implicit negligence of the
manufacturer. 2 13 Negligence has also been imputed from the act of placing
a defective product into the stream of commerce, 2 14 or from the nature of
the product itself.2 15 It should also be noted that in states where strict liabil-

ity is viewed as a procedural device by which the plaintiff is relieved of provifhe had knowledge of its
harmful character. The test, therefore, is whether the
seller would be negligent if he sold the article knowing of the risk involved.
Strict liability imposes what amounts to constructive knowledge of the condition of the product.
Id at 492, 525 P.2d at 1036 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). See Cepeda v.
Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978) (design defect strict liability "substantially coordinate with liability on negligence principles" except that dangerousness of the product is imputed), overruled on other grounds, Suter v. San Angelo
Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979). For an excellent discussion
of the struggle in the courts to purge strict liability of negligence concepts, see Powers, The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEx. L. REV. 777 (1983).
211. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 11, § 99, at 659-60 (citations omitted).
Dean Prosser stated: "The prevailing interpretation of 'defective' is that the product
does not meet the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer as to its safety.
It has been said that this amounts to saying that if the seller knew of the condition he
would be negligent in marketing the product." Id See also Keeton, Product Liability
and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 37-38 (1973) (a product is unreasonably dangerous "if a reasonable person would conclude that the magnitude of the
scientifically perceivable danger as t?is proved to be at the time of trial outweighed the

benefits of the way the product was so designed and marketed") (emphasis in original); Wade, supra note 35, at 839-40 (defective product is one which "is so likely to be
harmful to persons. . . that a reasonable prudent manufacturer. . . , who had actual knowledge of its harmful character would not place it on the market"). Cf Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect. From Negligence [to Warranty/ to Strict
Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 609-10, 647-49 (1980) (negligence undercurrent in risk-utility analyses).
212. See, e.g., Brewster, Comparative Negligence in Strict Liabill Cases, 42 J. AIR L.

& COMM. 107, 110 (1976) (design defect implies fault on the part of the designer);
Carestia, supra note 10, at 63-64 (a "defect" may be defined as a "deficiency," "blemish" or "faul?') (emphasis in original) (citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY (2d ed. 1961)). See also Murray v. Fairbanks-Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 159 (3d
Cir. 1979) (product may be considered "faulty" so as to bridge semantic gap between
negligence and strict liability).
213. See Twerski, supra note 154, at 329 ("the more serious the defect the more
culpable is the defendant").
214. See, e.g., W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 20, at 31
(1979) (in warranty, "fault" may be equated to act of selling a product that was not of
merchantable quality); Case Comment, Comparative Negligence and Strict Products Liability.
Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 883, 888

(1977) (fault inherent in manufacture and marketing of defective product).
215. See, e.g., Frumer, The Social Purpose of Tort, in UNIFORM PRODUCTS LIABILITY AcT § 1.03 (V. Walkowiak ed. 1980). Frumer concludes that "fault" in the sense
of negligence is no longer required for recovery for a civil wrong; instead, "fault" in
the product is sufficient. Id (citing Traynor, The Ways and Means of Defective Products
andStrict Liabity, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965)). See also Wade, supra note 127, at 377
(act of manufacturing a "bad" product is legal fault).
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ing the manufacturer's negligence, 2 16 it is assumed that the manufacturer
was negligent in some way. 217 Moreover, negligence is the standard for liability in products liability warning cases, 218 and the negligence standard has
also been proposed for products liability design defect cases. 219 Therefore, it
is submitted that negligence and strict liability are sufficiently interrelated to
permit the application of comparative principles to strict liability actions.
The Correia court also reasoned that the application of comparative
principles to strict liability would be inconsistent with the policy behind
220
strict liability of placing the cost of injuries on the product manufacturer.
However, the manufacturer is not an insurer of his product, and his liability
does not extend to all injuries caused by the product, but is limited to those
216. For a discussion of the policy behind strict liability of relieving a plaintiff of
difficult proof problems in negligence, see note 33 and accompanying text supra.
217. See, e.g., Westerbeke & Meltzer, supra note 154, at 69 (strict liability imposed to deter manufacturers from creating unsafe products implies that negligent
conduct of manufacturers can be identified and eliminated); Case Comment, supra
note 214, at 887 (though plaintiff relieved from proving fault under strict liability,
fault elements inherent in concept of "defective" product).
218. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). The Fifth Circuit concluded in Borel that
a seller is under a duty to warn of only those dangers that are reasonably
foreseeable. The requirement of foreseeability coincides with the standard
of due care in negligence cases in that a seller must exercise reasonable care
and foresight to discover a danger in his product and to warn users and consumers of that danger.

493 F.2d at 1088 (citing Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968))
(emphasis in original). See also Woodhill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 35, 402
N.E.2d 194, 198 (1980) (plaintiff must "prove that the defendant manufacturer knew
or should have known of the danger that caused the injury" and failed to warn plaintiff of the danger); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965)
(manufacturer of product which contains ingredient not reasonably expected in
product is required to warn against danger of which he has knowledge "or by the
application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge"). For articles discussing the negligence undertones in strict liability warning
cases, see Jackson, The Duty to Warn and Strict Liabih'ty, 48 INS. COUNS. J. 381 (1981);
Comment, The Duty to Warn Under Strlct Products Liabitiy as Limited by the Knowledge
Requirement: A Regretful Retention ofNegligence Concepts, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 125 (1981);
Comment, Is There a Distinction Between Strict Liabiity and Negligence in Fai/ure to Warn
Actions?, 15 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 983 (1981).
219. See MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT § 104(B)(1), 44 Fed. Reg.
62,721 (1979). The Act provides as follows:
In order to determine that the product was unreasonably unsafe in design, the trier of fact must find that, at the time of manufacture, the likelihood that the product would cause the claimant's harm or similar harms,

and the seriousness of those harms outweighed the burden on the manufacturer to design a product that would have prevented those harms, and the
adverse effect that alternative design would have on the usefulness of the
Id

product.
For a discussion of the Act, see note 128 supra.

220. For a discussion of the Correia court's opinion that comparative principles
are incompatible with the policy of strict liability, see notes 193-98 and accompany-

ing text supra.
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caused by a defect in the product. 22 ' Therefore, it is submitted that a manufacturer should not be liable for that portion of a user's injuries caused by
the user's contributory negligence, but only for that which is actually caused
222
by the defect.
Furthermore, it is argued that innocent consumers will ultimately bear
the cost of an individual's negligent conduct by paying higher prices for the
223
products if courts refuse to apply a comparative analysis to strict liability.
In addition, the product's price may rise to an artificially high level, causing
224
the consuming public to switch to a cheaper, less safe product.
The application of comparative principles to strict products liability
will also create more equitable results since a plaintiffs fault will only act to
reduce an award, rather than bar the action. The Correia court, while refus221. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 733, 575 P.2d 1162, 1166,
144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 384 (1978) (manufacturer not liable for any injury caused by
product, only those caused by a "defect"); Smith, Status of the "Unreasonably Dangerous"
Element in Product Liabihty Actions, 15 FORUM 706, 707 (1979-80) (to avoid absolute

liability, manufacturer only liable for a product "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous"). But see Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d
436 (1944). In a concurring opinion in Escola, Justice Traynor concluded that "it
should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an
article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings." Id at 461, 150
P.2d at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring). However, no court has adopted the Traynor
view by imposing absolute liability in a product liability case. See Vandall, "Design
Defect" in Products Liability: Rethinking Neghgence and Strict Liability, 43 OHIO ST. L.J.
61, 79 (1982).
222. For a discussion of jurisdictions using a comparative causation approach,
see notes 78-100 and accompanying text supra. The Correia court's acceptance of assumption of the risk and unforseeable misuse as defenses would seem to lend support
for acceptance of comparative causation principles, because the court stressed that
when those defenses are asserted, the defendant is asserting that it was the plaintiff's
conduct which caused the injury. For a discussion of the Correia court's analysis of
assumption of the risk and unforseeable misuse, see notes 199-200 and accompanying
text supra.

223. See Wade, supra note 127, at 379 ("Why is it desirable to transfer to other
users of the product-all innocent-the cost of that part of the plaintiff's injury that
is attributable to his own fault?"); Comment, supra note 52, at 497 (innocent consumers have been bearing the costs of both negligent defendants' and contributorily negligent plaintiffs' actions); Note, Mulherin v. Ingersoll: Utah Adopts Comparative
Principles in Strict Products Liability Cases, 1982 UTAH L. REV. 461, 473 (where there is
an "accident," it is fair for seller to spread costs over consuming public; however,
where plaintiff is partially responsible, it is unreasonable to place this burden on
innocent consumers). See also Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp.
740, 754 (D. Kan. 1978) ("Why is it desirable to transfer to... third parties the cost
of that part of a plaintiff's injury which is attributable to his own culpable
conduct?").
224. See Murray v. Fairbanks-Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979). The court
noted that by ignoring contributory negligence the cost of a manufacturer's product
would rise to a point above the level actually attributable to the risks posed by the
defective product. Id at 161. Consequently, the court explained, "[i]f the future cost
of a product does not accurately reflect the risk posed, then consumers may actually
choose cheaper, less safe products because the cost of the manufacturer's product is
artificially high." Id. (citing G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970)).
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ing to apply comparative principles to strict liability, maintained assumption of the risk 225 and product misuse 226 as absolute defenses. With the
application of comparative principles, however, these two defenses, along
with the "patent danger doctrine," 227 would cease to be total bars to recovery and, instead, would only reduce the plaintiff's award. 228 It is submitted
that this is the more equitable approach since it apportions liability, rather
2 29
than applying an "all or nothing" rule.
It is finally submitted that the Correia decision will not reverse the trend
among the states towards applying comparative principles to strict products
liability.

2 30

225. For the Correia court's discussion of assumption of the risk as a total bar to
recovery, see note 199 and accompanying text supra.
226. For the Correia court's discussion of product misuse as a total bar to recovery, see note 200 and accompanying text supra.
227. See Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950), overruled, Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976). Under
the patent danger doctrine, the manufacturer is required to make a product safe from
any latent defects and "if its functioning creates no danger or peril that is not known
to the user, then the manufacturer has satisfied the law's demands." 301 N.Y. at 472,
95 N.E.2d at 804. See also Bemis Co. v. Rubush, 427 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (Ind. 1981),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982) (manufacturer has no duty to warn if danger is open
and obvious to all). For a discussion of the current status of the "patent danger
doctrine," see Darling, The PatentDangerRule: An Analysis anda Survey of its Vitahty, 29
MERCER L. REV. 583 (1978).
228. See, e.g., Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740 (D. Kan.
1978) (product misuse); Sun Valley Airlines v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp.
598 (D. Idaho 1976) (product misuse); Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F.
Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972) (assumption of risk); Auburn Mach. Works Co. v. Jones,
366 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1979) (patent danger); South v. A.B. Chance Co., 96 Wash. 2d
439, 635 P.2d 728 (1981) (assumption of risk).
229. See Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 65 Hawaii 447, 461, 654 P.2d 343, 352
(1982) (injection of comparative negligence principles into strict products liability
actions will accomplish more equitable result since plaintiff's award will be reduced
in proportion to his responsibility for injury). But see Note, ProductsLiability, Comparative Negligence, and the Allocation of Damages Among Multiple Defendants, 50 S. CAL. L.
REV. 73, 101-02 (1976) ("all or nothing" rule preferable since any allocation of fault
under comparative negligence would be arbitrary).
230. See Kroll, ComparativeFault. A New Generation in Products Liability, 1977 INS.
L.J. 492 (comparative fault will continue to be applied to strict products liability as
courts try to broaden defenses based on culpable conduct of product user). But see
ProductsLiability--ComparativeNegligence-Effect of Plaintif'sAlleged Misconduct in a Products Liability Case Based Upon Product Manufacturer's Strict Liability--In Landmark Decision
MassachusettsSupreme JudicialCourt Holds That Both State's ComparativeNegligence Statute
and Principleof ComparativeFault are Inapplicable to a Strict ProductsLiability Action Against
Tire Manufacturerfor Wrongful Death of Truck Driver Causedby Blowout of Defective Tire, 26
ATLA L. REP. 153, 155 (1983) (Massachusetts decision not to apply comparative
principles to strict products liability predicted to have "immediate impact" and
"abiding influence" on the issue).
North Dakota has recently applied comparative principles to strict liability, becoming the 27th state to do so. See Day v. General Motors Corp., 345 N.W.2d 349
(N.D. 1984).
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PENNSYLVANIA: AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE THE APPLICATION

Strict liability originated in Pennsylvania in the 1966 decision of Webb v.
Zern.23 1 In Webb, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of
strict liability as enunciated in section 402A of the Second Restatement of
Torts. 232 However, nine years later, in Berkebile v. Brantey Helicopter Corp.,233
a two-member plurality of the court determined that the "unreasonably
dangerous" phrase in section 402A was not to be used when charging a jury
in strict products liability actions. 23 4 The Berkebile court stated that in order
to hold the manufacturer strictly liable, a plaintiff only had to prove that the
235
product was defective and that the defect caused the plaintiff's injuries.
Three years after Berkebile, the court re-examined the role of the term
"unreasonably dangerous" in strict liability in Azzarello v. Black Brothers
2 36
Co.
The court noted that the term's purpose was to limit liability so that a
supplier of products would not become their insurer.2 3 7 Consequently, the
231. 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966). In Webb, the plaintiff sued a brewer,
beer distributor, and keg manufacturer for injuries resulting from a beer keg explosion. Id at 426, 220 A.2d at 854.
232. Id at 427, 220 A.2d at 854. The court declared that § 402A was the law of
Pennsylvania. Id For the text of § 402A, see note 38 supra. For a general discussion
of § 402A, see notes 37-41 and accompanying text supra.
233. 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975). The plaintiff sued the manufacturer of a
helicopter for the wrongful death of her husband who was killed when the helicopter
crashed. Id at 91, 337 A.2d at 897. The plaintiff alleged defective design of the rotor
system, defective design and manufacture of the rotor blade, and inadequate warnings regarding the risks involved in using the helicopter. Id at 92, 337 A.2d at 897.
234. Id. at 96, 337 A.2d at 900. The court noted that commentators and other
courts had incorrectly interpreted the term "unreasonably dangerous" as injecting
"reasonable man" concepts into strict liability. Id at 95, 337 A.2d at 899. The court
then stated that "reasonable man" concepts have no place in strict liability. Id at 96,
337 A.2d at 900. Consequently, the court ruled that it was unnecessary and improper
to charge a jury on reasonableness. Id The court noted that the true purpose of the
"unreasonably dangerous" clause was to differentiate products which by their very
nature were unsafe but not defective from those which actually were defective. Id at
95, 337 A.2d at 899.
235. Id at 93-94, 337 A.2d at 898. The court stated that if the plaintiff proved
defect and causation, then he would have proved that the product was unreasonably
dangerous as to him. Id at 97, 337 A.2d at 900.
236. 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978). The plaintiff was injured when his
right hand was pinched between two hard rubber rollers in a coating machine which
was manufactured by the defendant. Id at 549, 391 A.2d at 1022. On appeal, the
court considered what the appropriate form of jury instruction was under § 402A in
Pennsylvania. Id
237. Id at 554-55, 391 A.2d at 1024. The court stated that the critical factor in
determining whether liability was justified was whether the product was "unreasonably dangerous." Id The court noted that Dean Keeton had observed: "The phrase
was not intended as setting forth two requirements but only one, the notion being
that the product was not defective for the purpose of shifting losses due to physically
harmful events unless it was 'unreasonably dangerous.'" Id at 555 n.7, 391 A.2d at
1024 n.7 (quoting Keeton, supra note 211, at 32). The court added that the words
"unreasonably dangerous" had no independent significance but were merely a label
to be applied when it was determined that the supplier should bear the risk of loss.
480 Pa. at 556, 391 A.2d at 1025.
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court stated that it was a judge's duty to determine whether a defendant
should be held liable under the plaintiffs averment of the facts, taking into
consideration social policy and proper placement of the risk of loss. 238 Then,
if the judge determined that liability would be justified, it was the jury's
2 39
duty to determine whether there was a defect in the product.
Federal district courts in Pennsylvania have interpreted Azzarello as
holding that the trial judge, in a strict products liability suit, has the initial
responsibility of determining whether the product is "unreasonably dangerous." 2 40 In addition, the Pennsylvania Superior Court, in Lobianco v. Property
Protection, Inc., 24 1 held that it was the court's responsibility to decide whether
242
it is appropriate and just to impose strict liability in a particular case.
It is submitted that the Azzarello court's reintroduction of the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement into strict products liability is a signal to
the courts to assert control over the imposition of strict liability. 243 It is submitted that it may also be read as a step by the courts to cut back on, or
limit, manufacturer's liability. 244 Consequently, it is submitted that Pennsylvania courts will apply comparative principles to strict products liability
since such action would be consistent with the courts' retaining control over
the development and application of the strict products liability theory, and
would be a means of limiting a manufacturer's liability to that portion of an
injury caused by the defect in his product.
238. 480 Pa. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026. The court stated that it was the judge's
duty to determine questions such as "When does the utility of a product outweigh the
unavoidable danger it may pose?" Id The court ruled that such a question was a
question of law for the judge and that its resolution depended upon social policy. Id
239. Id. It was the jury's duty to determine whether the facts of the case supported the averments of the complaint. Id The court added that a jury could find a
defect "where the product left the supplier's control lacking any element necessary to
make it safe for its intended use or possessing any feature that renders it unsafe for
the intended use." Id at 559, 391 A.2d at 1027.
240. See, e.g., Wieder v. Towmotor Corp., 568 F. Supp. 1058, 1061 (E.D. Pa.
1983); Abdul-Warith v. Arthur G. McKee & Co., 488 F. Supp. 306, 314 n.4 (E.D. Pa.
1980), aj'dmem., 642 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1981); Orion Ins. Co. v. Limited Technologies
Corp., 502 F. Supp. 173, 176 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
241. 292 Pa. Super. 346, 437 A.2d 417 (1981). The plaintiff sought to hold the
defendant strictly liable for the $35,815 stolen from her house when a burglar alarm
installed by the defendant failed to work. Id at 348, 437 A.2d at 419.
242. Id at 361, 437 A.2d at 425. The court stated "that whether a case is one

appropriate for the imposition of strict liability is a decision that the court must make
according to what 'social adjustment' it believes just." Id The court determined that
the defendant installer was not to be held strictly liable because it was more equitable
to place the risk of loss on the plaintiff homeowner since she could have more easily
insured against the loss. Id at 360-61, 437 A.2d at 424-25.
243. See Hammond v. International Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 650 (3d Cir.

1982) (interpreting Azzarello) (trial court must exercise its own judgment in determining whether strict liability is justifiably imposed).
244. See Note, Products Liabtly---Restatement (Second) of Torts--Secton O42A-Uncertain StandardsofResponsibi'ity in Design Defect Cases-After Azzarello, Will Manufacturer
be Absolutely Liable tn Pennsylvania., 24 VILL. L. REV. 1035, 1046-47 (1979) (if "unreasonably dangerous" language is eliminated, strict liability draws dangerously close to
absolute liability).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss3/4

42

Kulig: Comparative Negligence and Strict Products Liability: Where Do We

1983-84]

COMMENT

This view finds support in a dissenting opinion in Hamme v. Dreis &
Krump Manufacturing Co. 2 4 5 In Hamme, Judge Rosenn of the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals predicted that Pennsylvania's judiciary would introduce
comparative principles into strict products liability. 246 Judge Rosenn believed that Pennsylvania courts are free to follow other jurisdictions in extending comparative principles to strict products liability 247 since the
Pennsylvania doctrine of strict liability is a judicial creation. 248
Judge Rosenn's view, however, is not shared by Judge Fullam of the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In Contiv. FordMotor Co., 249 Judge Fullam
held that, under Pennsylvania law, comparative negligence principles are
not to be applied in strict products liability actions. 250 Judge Fullam based
his opinion on what he perceived to be the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
desire to keep negligence concepts divorced from strict products liability theory. 25 ' While noting that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals would prefer
245. 716 F.2d 152, 155-67 (3d Cir. 1982) (Rosenn, J., dissenting). In Hamme, the
majority of the court held that the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act precluded the adjudication of an employer's comparative fault in an action brought by
an employee against a manufacturer who sought to join the employer as a thirdparty defendant. Id at 153-54.
246. Id at 166-67 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). Judge Rosenn noted that the Pennsylvania comparative negligence act did not appear applicable to strict liability, since
it was limited to negligence actions. Id at 166 (Rosenn, J., dissenting) (interpreting
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102(a) (Purdon 1982)). Judge Rosenn also noted that
contributory negligence was judicially abolished as a defense in strict liability. Id
(citing McCown v. International Harvester Co., 463 Pa. 13, 342 A.2d 381 (1975)).
The dissent further noted that strict liability did not require proof of a defendant's
negligence. Id.(citing Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d
893 (1975)). However, Judge Rosenn believed that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
would bring comparative negligence principles to bear in a strict liability suit. Id
247. 71 F.2d at 167 (Rosenn, J., dissenting) (citing Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424,
220 A.2d 853 (1966)). Judge Rosenn noted that Pennsylvania "has not been reluctant to simplify, clarify, and improve the law in light of modern conditions." Id
(quoting Gilbert v. Korvette's Inc., 457 Pa. 602, 612 n.27, 327 A.2d 94, 100 n.27
(1974)).
248. Id (citing Alaska, Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555
P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976); California, Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575
P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978); Florida, West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336
So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976)). Cf Timby & Plevyak, The Effect of Pennsylvania's Comparative
Negligence Statute on Traditional Tort Concepts and Doctrines, 24 VILL. L. REV. 453, 478-79
(1979) (analyses of those states applying comparative principles to strict liability are
persuasive on issue of whether Pennsylvania will modify strict liability to allow for
consideration of plaintiff's contributory negligence).
249. 578 F. Supp. 1429 (E.D. Pa. 1983). A husband and wife sued an automobile manufacturer for injuries received as a result of alleged defects in the automobile.
Id.at 1430. The wife was injured when, in the process of entering the automobile on
the passenger side, the vehicle moved suddenly backward, causing her to fall. Id
The defendant manufacturer alleged that the husband, who was in the driver's seat
at the time of the accident, was negligent. Id
250. Id at 1434-35. The jury had found the husband 75% the cause of the wife's
injuries, and the automobile 25% the cause. Id at 1432.
251. Id at 1434 (citing Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337
A.2d 893 (1975); Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978)).
Judge Fullam believed that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not hold "that
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to apply comparative principles to product liability cases,25 2 Judge Fullam
rejected the application since he was required to follow Pennsylvania state
law.

253

VII.

CONCLUSION

Because Pennsylvania adopted strict liability by judicial decision 254 and
enacted a modified comparative negligence statute which permits some recovery as long as the plaintiff's negligence is not greater than that of the
defendant, 255 it is submitted that Pennsylvania courts should be impressed
with the almost unanimous action taken towards applying comparative principles to strict liability by the twelve other states which have modified comparative negligence statutes like Pennsylvania's. 256 Pennsylvania should
the liability of a manufacturer for a defective product is equivalent to 'causal negligence' which is to be apportioned under the [Pennsylvania comparative negligence]
statute". Id at 1434. Judge Fullam noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in
Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County School Dist., 496 Pa. 590, 437 A.2d 1198
(1981), maintained assumption of the risk as a total defense in strict products liability
cases, while abolishing it in negligence cases because of the enactment of the comparative negligence statute. 578 F. Supp. at 1434. He concluded that these actions indicated that Pennsylvania would not apply comparative negligence to strict products
liability actions. Id
252. 578 F. Supp. at 1434. Judge Fullam recognized that the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, in Murray v. Fairbanks-Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979), applied the Virgin Islands comparative negligence statute to products liability cases in
the Virgin Islands. 578 F. Supp. at 1433. For a discussion of Murray,see notes 99-100
and accompanying text supra.
253. 578 F. Supp. at 1434-35. Judge Fullam believed that the application of
comparative negligence to strict products liability would constitute a "significant departure" from the law in Pennsylvania. Id The judge noted that in diversity cases a
federal district court is obligated to apply the law of the jurisdiction in which it sits.
Id at 1435.
254. Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966). For a discussion of Webb,
see notes 231-32 and accompanying text supra.
255. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102(a) (Purdon 1982). The statute provides:
In all actions brought to recover damages for negligence resulting in
death or injury to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may have
been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery by the plaintiff or his legal representative where such negligence was not greater than
the causal negligence of the defendant or defendants against whom recovery is sought, but any damages sustained by the plaintiff shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff.
Id
A Philadelphia trial court has applied the state's comparative negligence statute
in apportioning percentages of contribution between strictly liable and negligent defendants. Dambacher v. Mallis, 7 Phila. 14, 55-60 (Phila. County Ct. C. P. 1981).
The court cited Murray v. Fairbanks-Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979), as precedent that a comparative "negligence" statute could be extended to strict liability
actions. 7 Phila. at 56-58. For a discussion of Murray, see notes 99-100 and accompanying text supra.
256. See, e.g., Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West Supp.
1984); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-4 (West Supp. 1983-84); Montana,
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (1983); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1979);
New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (1983); New Jersey, N.J. STAT.
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further take note that all of these states have judicially adopted strict liability, as it has. 25 7 Five states, by judicial decision, have applied their modified
258
comparative negligence statutes to strict liability.
One state's judiciary applied a pure form of comparative analysis to
strict liability, even though the comparative negligence statute was of the
modified type. 259 Two states have made comparative principles statutorily
applicable to strict liability, one applying a pure approach, 26° the other, a
modified approach. 26 1 Only one state has refused to apply comparative
principles to strict liability, 262 while the remaining three states have yet to
26 3
decide the issue.
It is hoped that a future Pennsylvania court will determine that comparative principles are compatible with the policies underlying strict products liability theory. 264 The court should then determine that pure
ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West Supp. 1983-84); Ohio, OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.19
(Page 1983); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 13 (West Supp. 1983-84); Oregon, OR.

REV.

STAT. § 18.470 (1981); Texas, TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a

(Vernon Supp. 1982-83); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973 & Supp.
1983); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1983).
257. Connecticut, Wachtel v. Rosol, 159 Conn. 496, 271 A.2d 84 (1970); Indiana, Perfection Paint & Color Co. v. Konduris, 147 Ind. App. 106, 258 N.E.2d 681
(1970); Montana, Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d
268 (1973); Nevada, Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 86 Nev. 408, 470 P.2d 135 (1970);
New Hampshire, Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, 110 N.H. 36, 260 A.2d 111
(1969); New Jersey, Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305
(1965); Ohio, Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185
(1966); Oklahoma, Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974);
Oregon, Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967); Texas, Darryl
v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969); Vermont, Zaleskie v. Joyce, 133 Vt.
150, 333 A.2d 110 (1975); Wisconsin, Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d
55 (1967).
258. Montana, Zahrte v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 661 P.2d 17 (Mont. 1983); New
Hampshire, Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978);
New Jersey, Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140
(1979); Oregon, Sandford v. Chevrolet Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 292 Or. 590, 642
P.2d 624 (1982); Wisconsin, Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
For a discussion of Thibault, see notes 169-71 and accompanying text supra. For a
discussion of Suter, see notes 64-68 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of
Dippel, see notes 46-51 and accompanying text supra.
259. Texas, General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977), overruled on other grounds, Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
For a discussion of Hopkins, see notes 92-94 and accompanying text supra.
260. Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572o (West Supp. 1984). For
the text of the Connecticut statute, see note 120 supra.
261. Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-33-2 to 34-4-33-4 (West Supp. 1983-84).
For the text of the Indiana statute, see note 125 supra.
262. Oklahoma, Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974).
For a discussion of the Kirklandcase, see notes 106-08 and accompanying text supra.
263. Nevada, Ohio, and Vermont have not yet considered whether comparative
principles should be applied to strict products liability actions.
264. For a discussion of the compatibility of comparative principles and strict
liability theory, see notes 143-77 and 203-29 and accompanying text supra.
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265
The
comparative principles will be applied to strict products liability.
statute
negligence
comparative
modified
court should not apply the state's
since such an application may undermine the policy of strict liability by
266
Therefore it is submitted,
precluding some plaintiffs from any recovery.
in agreement with Judge Rosenn in Hamme, that the judicial adoption and
application of comparative principles to strict products liability is appropriate since the strict liability theory was created, and has been developed and
267
molded, by the judiciary.

Lawrence R. Kulig
265. For a discussion and analysis of courts which applied pure comparative
principles to strict liability, see notes 90-100 and 164-67 and accompanying text supra.
266. For a discussion of potential problems arising from the application of a
modified comparative negligence statute to strict liability, see notes 168-76 and accompanying text supra.
267. For a discussion of judicial adoption of strict liability as justifying the application of comparative principles to strict liability, see notes 160-63 and accompanying text supra.
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